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THE GOLDILOCKS HYPOTHESIS:
BALANCING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AT THE
BOUNDARY OF THE FIRM'
Dan L. Burk*
Brett H. McDonnell**
Recent scholarship has begun to assess the role of intellectual
property rights in the theory of the Coasean firm. Some of this schol-
arship has looked at the effects of intellectual property on decisions to
"make or buy" inputs to production. Other scholarship has looked at
the effects of intellectual property on allocation of resources between
employees and the firm. In this article, we integrate these two lines of
scholarship, positing a "Goldilocks hypothesis" for the proper dispo-
sition of intellectual property rights. We argue that to properly allo-
cate resources within the firm, property rights must be calibrated so as
to avoid on the one hand misappropriation of firm resources when
rights are inadequate, and on the other hand dissipation of employee
incentives when rights are excessive. Similarly, we argue that to prop-
erly manage transaction costs at the edge of firms, property rights
must be calibrated so as to avoid on the one hand inefficient integra-
tion into the firm of specialized functions when property rights are in-
adequate, and on the other hand a fragmented anticommons of spe-
cialty firms when property rights are excessive. Thus, we conclude
that in order to contribute to the efficient structure of firms, intellec-
tual property rights can be neither too weak nor too strong, but must
be constituted "just right."
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern economic theories of the firm have developed to consider
how hierarchical firms serve to lower the cost of transactions that would
t Copyright 2006 by Dan L. Burk and Brett H. McDonnell.
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thank Tom Cotter, Yochai Benkler, David McGowan, Robert Suggs, Manuel Utset, and participants
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be prohibitively high if undertaken in the marketplace. Firms exist, it is
argued, because some production functions are better performed without
costly negotiations, and the decision whether to make a given input or to
buy it from another in the market will depend on the relative transaction
costs of each option. Law and economics scholarship has adopted the
theory of the firm to describe how the law may help lower transaction
costs both within firms and between firms, guiding parties to the lowest
cost solutions. Such cost-lowering legal mechanisms include laws govern-
ing the fiduciary duties of managers and employees, laws facilitating con-
tracts, and laws establishing default rules, such as property rights, for
those occasions when contracts fail to foresee and provide for disputes.
Property law in particular has become important in modern theories of
the firm, as property rights both facilitate exchanges between firms and
secure assets within firms.
Among the most important assets of the modern firm are intellec-
tual properties in a variety of legal forms, including patents, copyrights,
trade secrets, and trademarks. Recent scholarship has begun to explore
the role that the law governing such intellectual property plays in defin-
ing the nature of the firm. In one recent study, Oren Bar-Gill and
Gideon Parchomovsky have argued that strong intellectual property
rights, of the sort conferred by the patent system, are important to defin-
ing the boundary between the firm and the market.1 Robert Merges has
similarly suggested that strong intellectual property rights will foster the
development of smaller, innovative firms,2 and together with Ashish
Arora, he has developed a model illustrating such a scenario.3
At the same time, research in a different direction has addressed the
effect of intellectual property on transaction costs within the firm. One
of us (Burk) has, in previous work, suggested that the structure of intel-
lectual property law generally reflects and supports property-based theo-
ries of the firm as those theories relate to the disposition of assets within
the firm.4 Burk argues that many aspects of intellectual property law
help define the allocation of creative works between employer and em-
ployee, consonant with an agency-based and property-based view of the
firm.5 In a similar vein, Paul Heald has argued that patents can help
ameliorate problems of team production and asset partitioning within the
1. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries
of the Firm (June 24,2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
School), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=559195.
2. See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1477 (2005) [hereinafter Merges, Transactional View]; see also Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights, Input Markets, and the Value of Intangible Assets (Feb. 9, 1999), http://www.law.berkeley.
edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/iprights.pdf [hereinafter Merges, Intangible Assets].
3. See Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights, and Firm
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004).
4. Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHi. L. REv. 3 (2004).
5. Id. at 13-14, 17-18.
[Vol. 2007
THE GOLDILOCKS HYPOTHESIS
firm.6 In related work, Robert Merges has argued that legal rules assign-
ing the rights in employee inventions to employers make economic
sense .
7
These two complementary lines of scholarship appear to converge
at the boundary of the firm, illuminating the role of intellectual property
as it applies, respectively, to interfirm and intrafirm transactions. In this
article, we consider the role of intellectual property rights in both of
these contexts, integrating these bodies of scholarship as they define the
boundary of the firm from the inside out, as well as from the outside in.
We argue that in each situation, defining and allocating intellectual
property rights plays an important role in demarcating the boundary of
the firm. In particular, we argue that intellectual property rights that are
improperly calibrated, that are either too strong or too weak, will lead to
inefficient firm and market structures.
The argument for strong property rights is largely apparent from
the two lines of previous scholarship; where transaction costs might deter
outsourcing to specialty suppliers, property rights will assist the consum-
mation of such transactions. At the same time, strong property rights
that allocate residual interest in intellectual property within firms will
prevent employees from walking away with the firm's assets. But we ar-
gue that this insight must be balanced against the hazards of property
rights that are too strong. Overly strong property rights potentially
threaten to create an "anticommons" of firms blocking each others' in-
novations, and in response, firms may integrate into inefficiently large
firms that internalize the problem created by excessive property protec-
tion. Similarly, inefficiently strong residual intellectual property rights
may hamper employee mobility and creativity, making it difficult for
firms to attract and retain quality employees. Thus, we posit a "Goldi-
locks hypothesis" for intellectual property rights and the firm: like the
size of a chair, the temperature of a porridge, or the firmness of a mat-
tress, the provision of intellectual property rights should not vary too far
to one extreme or another, but must be calibrated so that it is "just
right."8
We begin by reviewing the development of the theory of the firm
and the recent work examining intellectual property in light of theories
of the firm, particularly transaction cost economics and general property
rights theory. We describe current scholarship that considers the effect
of intellectual property on interfirm and intrafirm transactions, both cri-
tiquing and expanding on the insights in this literature. We then move to
6. See Paul Heald, A Transactions Cost Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005).
7. See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1 (1999).
8. See PETER & IONA OPIE, THE CLASSIC FAIRY TALES 199 (1974). The character "Goldi-
locks" is a relative newcomer to this English folktale, first appearing in the early twentieth century; in
the oldest recorded versions, the intruder into the house of the Three Bears is a disreputable old
woman who tastes their porridge, sits in their chairs, and sleeps in their beds. Id. at 199-200.
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a discussion of how these lines of scholarship may be integrated around a
"Goldilocks hypothesis" of intellectual property that is neither too strong
nor too weak, but "just right." We conclude with several observations
regarding the implications of our synthesis and suggest several lines of
future research that might naturally flow from our framework.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE FIRM
Intellectual property covers a wide range of subject matter: inven-
tions, poems, computer programs, chemical molecules, client lists, good-
will and firm reputation, business methods, databases, genomes. These
and many other informational entities can be covered by some form of
intellectual property right. As modern economies shift to high technol-
ogy manufacturing, service industries, and generation of intangible prod-
ucts, the importance of business assets rooted in intellectual property has
grown. Thus, the theory of the firm, which attempts to explain the struc-
ture and nature of business organizations, needs to account for the dispo-
sition of these important intangible assets. In turn, theories explaining
intellectual property perhaps need to more carefully contemplate the
role of firms. In this Part, we briefly review the fundamentals of the the-
ory of the firm and the nascent literature that has begun to address intel-
lectual property in terms of such theories.
A. The Theory of the Firm
Ronald Coase launched the modern theory of the firm in 1937 with
his germinal paper on "The Nature of the Firm."9 Coase explored the
basic question of why some production functions are executed within a
firm while others are executed between firms.1" Sometimes firms choose
to make a product or develop a capability internally, and other times
firms choose to buy expertise or products in the marketplace."1 What de-
termines this choice? In other words, Coase asked, what accounts for the
boundary of firms? Why are they the size they are, and not larger or
smaller? Indeed, why do we need activity carried on within firms at all,
given the efficiencies that economists generally associate with market
transactions?
Coase pointed to transaction costs as the guiding explanation for
the nature of firms. 2 There are a variety of costs generated when two
firms enter into a transaction with each other. Imagine making a prod-
uct, say that old standby example of a widget, that involves using two dif-
ferent assets A and B, and suppose that two different parties own those
9. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Early work by Knight
addresses similar questions. See F. H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921).
10. See Coase, supra note 9, at 393-94.
11. See id. at 394-96.
12. See id. at 395-96.
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assets. The owners of A and B may enter into a contract governing the
making of the widget, but they face many costs. First, they must search
for and identify each other as potential partners. Once they have found
each other, they must negotiate with each other as to the terms that will
govern their relationship in making the widget. Once they have reached
agreement and entered into a contract, each party must monitor the per-
formance of the other to ensure that it is doing as promised. Disputes
may arise as to whether one or both has performed as promised. Each of
these steps may generate costs that reduce the value that the transaction
creates.
13
Many of those costs can be avoided by bringing a transaction within
a firm, in which authorized agents execute decisions within a hierarchical
organization. This structure largely eliminates the costs associated with
search and identification because the production functions associated
with making the widget will be performed by known actors within the
firm. Negotiation costs are also curtailed because the parameters of the
manufacturing relationship are specified by executive fiat rather than by
bargaining." Performance monitoring costs are eliminated or curtailed
because of the alignment of interests within the firm; presumably actors
within the same firm have similar motivations not to defect from the pro-
ject. At a minimum, less costly nonlegal sanctions-such as termination
of employment-can be brought to bear as a threat for failure or non-
compliance of performance.
However, the firm faces its own set of transaction costs. Although
the motivations of actors within a firm tend to be more aligned than
those of separate firms, firms still face problems of both coordination and
motivation. Consider again our widget makers, and suppose now that
one firm owns both assets A and B. The interfirm costs described above
are no longer relevant. However, someone must coordinate the activities
involved in making the widgets. This involves identifying what must be
done and communicating instructions to the different employees doing
the tasks. Moreover, both managers and employees may not be properly
motivated to do what is best for the firm. If they can, they may try to di-
vert firm resources to themselves. Or, they may simply want to shirk and
not work very hard. Of course, the firm can try to detect and punish such
misbehavior, or give employees and managers incentives to pursue the
firm's best interests, but all such devices themselves involve costs. 5
Thus, both interfirm and intrafirm transactions involve their own set
of costs. Note that all of these transaction costs, both interfirm and in-
trafirm, arise from the unavoidable fact of incomplete and asymmetric
13. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 91-95 (4th ed. 2004).
14. See Coase, supra note 9, at 391-92.
15. The classic early pieces on how firms handle such agency costs are Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1972), and Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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information. Coase posited that the activity and size of firms would tend
to extend to, but not beyond, the point where overall transaction costs
are minimized. 6 That is, if a transaction can be accomplished at lower
cost within one firm than between two different firms, it will be done
within one firm, while if the interfirm transaction is cheaper, it will be
done between firms. 17 Evolutionary pressures will tend to reward firms
that have appropriate boundaries and punish those that are either too
large or too small. 8
Later writers elaborated upon Coase's basic framework. Oliver
Williamson emphasized several key concepts related to the problem of
transaction costs. 9 The fact that contracts are incomplete is crucial to
this problem. ° Parties could avoid many of the problems identified
above if they could write contracts that anticipated all possible future
events and dictated how all parties should act for each possibility.2 Such
contracts are impossibly costly to write for all but the very simplest of
transactions, however, and hence contracts will not provide for all con-
tingencies.22 Several important insights follow from the reality of incom-
plete contracting.
First, each party may attempt to benefit at the expense of other par-
ties on the occurrence of events not provided for in the contract. This
leads Williamson to consider the problem of "hold-ups."23 Parties may
make investments in specific assets in anticipation of a transaction. How-
ever, once they have begun to perform they may be subject to new or
opportunistic demands by their counterparts in the transaction, who rec-
ognize that, having made the investment, the performing party may now
find it hard to exit the transaction without losing the value of her invest-
ment. This is particularly a problem where the value of the investment is
much higher within a particular relationship than in other uses, i.e.,
where the investment's value is asset specific. This threat may discour-
age people from making valuable asset-specific investments that would
16. See Coase, supra note 9, at 401-02.
17. Recent commentary has suggested that communications technology may, in addition to mar-
ket negotiation and executive fiat, facilitate a third method of self-organizing production. See Yochai
Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375-78 (2002).
However, it is unclear how robust this potential production mechanism will prove. As David
McGowan and others have pointed out, the much-touted "open source" example of software produc-
tion retains all the hallmarks of a Coasean hierarchy. See Dan Burk, Bioinformatics Lessorns from the
Open Source Movement, in ETHICS, COMPUTING, AND GENOMICS: MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN
COMPUTATIONAL GENOMICS 247 (Herman T. Tavani ed., 2006); David McGowan, Legal Implications
of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 285-86.
18. See Coase, supra note 9, at 401-05.
19. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) [herein-
after WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE (1996).
20. See generally WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 19, at 56-57.
21. See generally id.
22. See generally id. at 54.
23. See id. at 79-80; see also Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Hold-ups, Standard Breach
Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 478 (1996).
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leave them vulnerable to hold-up. Williamson posits that transactions
will be structured in ways that reduce the hold-up problem.24
As a corollary to this insight, it has been recognized that contracts
cannot solve the hold-up problems that may occur within the firm any
more than they can solve the problems between firms. Employees,
whose interests are not necessarily aligned with those of the firm, are
subject to contracts, but an employment contract cannot anticipate every
contingency. Thus, employees may have occasion to act opportunisti-
cally, diverting firm resources to their own ends, or acting as internal
hold-ups in situations that have not been covered by their contract.
Some opportunistic activity can be ameliorated by noncontractual
mechanisms, such as stock options or bonuses, that reward employees in
alignment with the goals of the firm. Thus, duties and relationships
within the firm will be structured to reduce internal hold-up problems.25
A second important consideration that follows from incomplete
contracting is that because contracts do not dictate what parties are sup-
posed to do in all contingencies, very often there will be discretion in de-
ciding how to perform. Someone must decide what to do, and an impor-
tant aspect of both the contracts between firms and within firms is the
allocation of residual decision-making authority. The property rights
theory of the firm, developed by Oliver Hart together with Grossman
and Moore (GHM), focuses particularly on this residual authority. 6 If
property rights are vested in a firm, those residual rights allow the firm to
redeploy assets intended for interfirm bargains if the other party acts op-
portunistically.27 Similarly, residual authority over property allows the
firm to control the disposition of assets within the firm if employees act
opportunistically.28
Corporate law scholarship has begun to integrate the GHM frame-
work, leading to a de-emphasis on the "nexus of contracts" metaphor
and a greater focus on hierarchical decision-making authority within the
firm-seeing firms as "islands of conscious power."29 An important re-
cent extension of the GHM literature comes from Raghuram Ragan and
24. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 19, at 114-15.
25. For an overview of the transaction cost economics literature, see Howard A. Shelanski, Em-
pirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335
(1995).
26. See OLIVER D. HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 30 (1995) for an
overview. Critical contributions to this literature include Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs
and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988).
The authorial combinations of Grossman, Hart, and Moore have led to the acronym "GHM" for
property-based theories of the firm.
27. See HART, supra note 26, at 31-32.
28. See id. at 58.
29. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1638-39 (2001).
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Luigi Zingales.3 ° They analyze how firms structure their internal organi-
zation to give employees access to resources that the employees need for
their jobs.31 They also argue that it may make sense to vest ownership in
outside parties with little specific investment in a firm because allocating
too much power to insiders may allow them to use that power against
other insiders, an idea also explored in earlier work by Bengt Holm-
strom.
3 2
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have built on this work with their
team production theory of the firm.33 Blair and Stout argue that boards
of directors serve as mediating hierarchs coordinating and resolving con-
flicts between various firm insiders.3 The presence of such a neutral,
centralized decision maker helps assure the insiders that other insiders
will not expropriate available rents, and thereby encourages them to
make firm-specific investments.35 A question for this theory is whether
the directors have adequate incentives to do a good job.
The GHM formulation of the firm also argues that assets that have
higher value when used together will tend to be owned within the same
firm, as a way of reducing the hold-up problem.36 This observation was
expanded by David Teece and others under the rubric of "appropriabil-
ity," that is, conditions necessary for firms to profit from innovation.37
Firms will seek to minimize their exposure to hold-up by a variety of ap-
propriability mechanisms, such as by control over complementary assets
necessary to deployment of the innovation, or by building trusted rela-
tionships that are less likely to result in defection.3" Trade secrecy and
lead time are also common appropriability mechanisms.3 9 Employment
of intellectual property strategies, including patenting, have been recog-
nized as important appropriability mechanisms,4 and this recognition has
led to a growing scholarship on the role of intellectual property in deter-
mining the boundaries of the firm.41
30. See Raghuram G. Ragan & Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON.
387 (1998).
31. See id. at 388.
32. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324,325, 339-40 (1982).
33. See Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (2001).
34. Id. at 279-81.
35. Id.
36. See HART, supra note 26, at 50.
37. DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 19 (2000).
38. Id. at 29, 59.
39. David Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collabo-
ration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285,286-87 (1986).
40. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.
41. For more in-depth overviews of the theory of the firm, see PAUL MILGROM & JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1992); Oliver Hart, An Economist's
Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989); Michael J. Meurer, Law, Eco-
nomics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BuFF. L. REV. 727 (2004).
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B. The Role of Intellectual Property
Despite their centrality to business law and economics, considera-
tions regarding the size, nature, or structure of firms have been largely
absent from theories explaining intellectual property, including a striking
absence from economic theories of intellectual property. Scholars have
identified several possible justifications for intellectual property law, but
economic justifications have been predominant.42 The traditional focus
of intellectual property scholarship has been to analyze incentives to cre-
ate products of the sort covered by different forms of intellectual prop-
erty rights. In general, such scholarship has focused on the public good
nature of new ideas.43 New ideas, as a form of information, are typically
nonexhaustible-that is, use by one person does not preclude equal use
by anyone else. They are also nonexcludable - once other persons be-
come aware of the idea, it is hard to keep them from being able to use
it." Because the idea is nonexcludable, potential users will be reluctant
to pay for new ideas-their optimal strategy is to free-ride, waiting to ob-
tain the idea for free once it has been created. But if everyone waits to
obtain the idea for free, no one will make the investment to generate it in
the first instance. Consequently, private individuals will generally lack
incentives to produce an adequate level of public goods. A key point of
intellectual property is to help lessen the public good nature of new ideas
by giving creators the ability to legally exclude others from using the
ideas.
Invention or creation of new ideas is not the end of the story, how-
ever-development and provision of the new idea to the public are
equally if not more important. Intellectual property rights have func-
tions even after any given new idea has been created.45 The new product
must be developed and marketed in order to be useful. Persons other
than the original creators of the product will typically be better posi-
tioned to do these tasks. The public good nature of intellectual property
complicates incentives to develop intellectual products, as those trying to
develop a new product may find it hard to stop others from developing
the same idea, thereby reducing their own incentive to develop. We thus
need to encourage bargaining and coordination between various persons
with related assets in developing new products once they have been cre-
ated. This development may occur in firms other than the creating firm,
42. For a good, brief overview of the main justifications of intellectual property, and an evalua-
tion of its benefits and costs, see Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of
Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL'Y 273 (1998).
43. On public goods, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
44. On the public good nature of information, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
45. See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 42, at 279-80.
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or it may be done by different people and groups within the same firm in
which the product was created. 6
Disclosure rationales have also played an important role in the justi-
fication of intellectual property, particularly for patent law. One way
that developers of valuable information may try to prevent others from
using the idea is to hide it. Hiding useful information, though, has social
costs, as it prevents others from using the information. There are also
actual costs incurred by hiding the information; guards, fences, locks, and
passwords are costly. Protecting information by hiding it may result in
wasteful investment in secrecy. The law of trade secrecy supplies some
legal protection for confidential information, so that the information
holder need not overinvest in secrecy, 7 but the information still remains
inaccessible to the public. Thus, another purpose of intellectual property
law is to encourage disclosure of useful information by giving the devel-
opers of creative works rights over the works, so that even if others learn
about them, others can use the works only with the consent of the person
who holds the intellectual property right. Indeed, patent law conditions
the grant of an intellectual property right upon the explicit disclosure of
the claimed invention.'
The problem of disclosure to the public leads to questions about
disclosure in a more limited context, between parties to a transaction,
and ultimately to consideration of intellectual property and the firm.
Important elements of a theory regarding intellectual property and the
firm can be found in the work of Edmund Kitch, which has long been
discussed and debated on other grounds. Early on, Kitch addressed pat-
ents in the transactional context. The clearest application of this work is
directed to interfirm transactions. Kitch recognized early on that prop-
erty rights in intangible information serve to solve the "disclosure para-
dox" recognized by Kenneth Arrow: once the innovator discloses its idea
to the would-be developer, there is no reason left for the latter to com-
pensate the former, but before disclosure of the idea, the developer does
not know what it is worth.49 This creates a potential standoff, in which
the innovator is unwilling to disclose without assurances of payment, but
the developer is unwilling to give assurances until disclosure. This sce-
nario can be identified as an extreme variation on the hold-up problem in
46. On the role of intellectual property in encouraging development of already-created ideas, see
Burk, supra note 4, at 13-14, 18-20; Heald, supra note 6, at 489-91. Burk and Heald point to Edmund
Kitch's prospect theory as developing a similar idea. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) [hereinafter Kitch, Nature and Function]; see also Ed-
mund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980)
[hereinafter Kitch, Valuable Information] (discussing trade secrecy in the context of the firm).
47. See Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, ALB. L.J.
SC. & TECH. 121, 129 (1994); David Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSPEcTIVES 61,67 (1991).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
49. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
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transaction cost economics, where the opportunist is effectively able to
misappropriate the value of the asset because the asset is nonexcludable.
The disclosure problem is only slightly ameliorated by the availabil-
ity of trade secrecy, imposed primarily via contract, tort, or restitution.
The developer of an idea might attempt to impose confidentiality or du-
ties of loyalty via contract before agreeing to disclose valuable informa-
tion and may be unwilling to disclose the information absent such con-
tractual assurances. ° But potential licensees worry that the confidential
information will prove either not to be useful, or worse, to be informa-
tion that they were already aware of, that they were developing inde-
pendently, or that was publicly available from other public sources.51 In
such cases, it may be difficult for the licensee to prove that he obtained
the information elsewhere, not via misappropriation of the disclosure. 2
Thus, the potential licensee will be reluctant to enter into contractual as-
surances of confidentiality without knowing what will be disclosed, and
the paradox continues.
Kitch notes that this problem is essentially solved, at least for some
types of innovations, by implementation of the patent system.53 Patents
require, as a quid pro quo for a period of exclusivity, detailed public dis-
closure of how to make and use the invention claimed in the patent.54 By
publicly disclosing technical information, while protecting it by exclusiv-
ity, patents circumvent the Arrow paradox.55 Patent licensing is no
longer a bargain for disclosure, as that has already been accomplished by
the publication of the patent. Licensees need only look at the patent to
determine whether the information will be valuable to them. Neither
need the patentee worry about unauthorized use of the disclosed inven-
tion, as it has been secured by a property right that covers the invention
regardless of contractual protection. This insight unites the disclosure
and property rationales for intellectual property as the solutions to im-
pediments on each side of a transaction between firms.
Kitch's broader theory on patent rights also implicitly-though per-
haps unintentionally -illuminates the function of intellectual property in
lowering transaction costs within the firm. Kitch argues that the patent
system specifically operates not so much as a spur to future invention,
but rather as a claim allocation system to encourage efficient commer-
cialization and use of unrealized inventions.56 This he analogizes to a
"prospect" system of mineral claims, which encourages owners of private
50. See Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 46, at 278.
51. See 4 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 15.01[1][d][v] (2006).
52. Id.
53. Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 46, at 266, 277-78.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
55. See Arrow, supra note 49, at 619-22.
56. See Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 46, at 277-78.
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land to make efficient use of it.57 Exclusive rights must be assigned in or-
der to make efficient use of an invention, just as in real property exclu-
sive rights must be assigned in order to make efficient use of mineral re-
sources. Absent such an assignment, investment in the development of
an invention will be appropriated by those who have not paid the cost of
that investment. The private incentive to develop and market the inven-
tion would therefore be less than the social value of the investment.
Property rights in each case work to align public and private interests.5 8
Such coordination, Kitch suggests, deters wasteful races or duplica-
tive development of intangible creations.59 This approach focuses not so
much on assigning ownership in order to create ex ante incentives for
creation as on assigning ownership in order to force efficient use of crea-
tive works through coordinated licensing.' Indeed, Kitch's approach is
somewhat problematic as a theory of incentive. Its basis lies in the classic
"tragedy of the commons" 61 and in the hypothetical world lacking trans-
actions costs that Coase postulated in The Problem of Social Cost.62 The
tragedy of the commons predicts that exhaustible resources will be over-
used if publicly accessible, as each individual who uses the resource reaps
the benefits of personal use but absorbs only a fraction of the overall
costs. 63 Private property rights are considered the standard antidote for
the tragedy of the commons. 6 Under a private property regime, owners
of a resource bear the cost of using a resource, thus aligning private with
public interests.6' And, to the extent that transactions are costless, own-
ers can engage in arbitrage until each resource is held by the party ac-
cording it the highest value.66
But it is less clear that such a tragedy occurs when the resource is
not exhaustible, as in the case of intellectual property. Kitch sidesteps
this problem by noting that the resources used to develop intangible
goods are often tangible and exhaustible 67 -yet these goods are of course
already subject to allocation via the law of chattels and real property.
Indeed, even when considered as a theory of efficient intangible resource
57. Id. at 271, 273-75 (making the analogy to land explicit). Analogies between real property
and information goods may in many cases be misleading. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyber-
space, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 134-35, 146-48 (1999) [hereinafter Burk, Muddy Rules]; Dan L.
Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 53-54 (2000) [hereinafter
Burk, Trouble with Trespass].
58. Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 46, at 276.
59. Id. at 278.
60. See id. at 275-80.
61. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
62. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960).
63. Hardin, supra note 61, at 1244.
64. Id. at 1247.
65. See id.
66. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094-95 (1972) (discussing this implication
of Coase).
67. Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 46, at 275-76.
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management, Kitch's approach has been subject to a good deal of well-
founded skepticism. Kitch's emphasis on making a sole and despotic
rights holder responsible for coordinating the development, implementa-
tion, and improvement of an invention is problematic for precisely the
reason that Coase noted in The Problem of Social Cost: specifically,
transaction costs not only exist but are likely to be a significant impedi-
ment to the transfer of property rights.' The problem of locating and
engaging in costly marketplace negotiation with potential licensees will
tend to prevent optimal development licensing from occurring.69 Addi-
tionally, where the marketplace is concerned, we typically believe that
competition, rather than, monopoly control, will tend to force efficient
development of resources.
70
Yet it is precisely these same objections that lead to the theory of
the firm; it is because market transactions are costly that firms organize
as hierarchical production centers. The problem of transaction costs and
coordination might similarly make the "prospect" theory attractive as an
explanation of intellectual property within a firm. Kitch's theory has
typically been assumed to apply to coordination of development via li-
censing between firms. However, this role of coordination for intellectual
property resembles property-based theories of the firm, which suggests
application of the theory to coordination of development within the firm.
The core of Kitch's insight rests on a differential between the relative
cost of bargaining in the market and the cost of entrepreneurial control.
This is effectively the theory of the firm in the guise of a theory of prop-
erty rights. Although Kitch does not explicitly contemplate entrepreneu-
rial coordination of such rights within the firm, it is in that setting where
such coordination is vital. The idea that intellectual property might serve
as a remedy for transaction costs is the first step toward a theory of intel-
lectual property and the firm.
More recent scholarship has begun to explicitly treat the question of
intellectual property as a mechanism to lower transactions costs between
firms. In one recent study, Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky
have argued that strong intellectual property rights, of the sort the patent
system confers, are important to defining the boundary between the firm
and the market.71 Beginning, as Kitch did, with the problem of Arrow's
information disclosure paradox, they examine the implications of patent-
ing not only for disclosure, but also for integration or dis-integration of
specialized production functions that would produce innovative informa-
tion.72 They develop a simple model suggesting that strong intellectual
68. Coase, supra note 62, at 15-16.
69. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx L.
REV. 989, 998, 1052-53 (1997).
70. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129, 135-38 (2004).
71. Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 1-2.
72. Id. at 3-4.
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property protection may determine whether specialty functions are
brought within a firm.73 This is largely because integration offers the
only solution to the disclosure problem in the absence of intellectual
property protection. Conversely, intellectual property protection offers a
solution to the hold-up problem, other than integration. From this out-
come Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky derive several corollaries; for example,
because innovative information would be subject to appropriation if dis-
closed in transactions prior to patenting, they argue that innovative pre-
patent research will most likely be performed within a single firm, rather
than contracted out between firms.74 They suggest this finding has im-
portant implications for the financing and structure of research and de-
velopment projects.75
In a similar vein, Robert Merges has suggested that strong intellec-
tual property rights, such as patents, will play a critical role in facilitating
efficient transactions between smaller, dis-integrated, modular firms in
what has been dubbed the "post-Chandlerian" economy.76 Merges ar-
gues that, in the "new economy," innovation will be situated in smaller,
nimbler, specialized firms, rather than in large vertically integrated
firms.77  This industry structure implies a larger number of interfirm
transactions, as production functions that once would have been accom-
plished in-house are contracted out.78  This, he suggests, means that
property rights will take on an added importance in order to facilitate
this increased number of interfirm transactions.79 Specialized firms, he
predicts, will be fostered by the presence of strong patents because,
without patents, high transaction costs would otherwise cause specialized
firms to be integrated into larger business conglomerates. °
Merges argues that strong property rights facilitate transactions in
two ways: first, by overcoming the Arrow information disclosure prob-
lem in pre-contractual negotiations,81 and second, by providing alterna-
tive enforcement possibilities after a contract is executed.82 He reviews a
number of judicial opinions as case studies for both pre-contractual li-
ability and for post-contractual remedies.83 He argues that while courts
sometimes find legal theories that impose pre-contractual liability for
misappropriation of unpatented information, such claims are uncertain
73. Id. at 3-5.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
76. See Merges, Transactional View, supra note 2, at 1514; see also Merges, Intangible Assets,
supra note 2, at 1.
77. Merges, Transactional View, supra note 2, at 1513-14.
78. Id. at 1514.
79. Id. at 1516.
80. Id. at 1519.
81. Id. at 1503.
82. See id. at 1504.
83. See id. at 1491-1513.
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and proof of misappropriation in such cases is difficult.' Consequently,
he suggests that the presence of a property right "against the world" will
foster licensing relationships between firms.85 Importantly, he notes the
existence of other appropriability mechanisms, such as trusted relation-
ships, but emphasizes that property rights are "tried and true" legal
mechanisms for deterring opportunism. 86 He also notes that the presence
of patents may facilitate disclosure of information related to the patent-
in other words, that patents themselves function as appropriability
mechanisms for integrally related trade secrets and know-how.87
With regard to post-contractual remedies, Merges notes that the
presence of a property right offers property owners a second set of legal
claims in addition to, or in lieu of, breach of contract claims.' In the
United States, the choice between a claim for breach of contract and a
claim for patent infringement may mean a choice of forum between fed-
eral court or state courts.89 Since each court system entails its own exper-
tise, this choice may be important to a rights holder. The choice between
patent and contract claims may also affect the calculation of statutes of
limitations' and the measure of damages available.91 Although Merges'
particular examples are idiosyncratic to the U.S. system, presumably his
overall point is likely applicable as a general matter: property rights will
offer different remedy options than contracts, and knowing those addi-
tional remedies are available ex post may prompt more bargains ex ante.
In earlier, unpublished work from the late 1990s, Merges pursues an
even more ambitious agenda of applying the theory of the firm to inter-
firm intellectual property transactions. 92 There he employs the GHM re-
sidual property model to argue that the availability of strong property
rights in the form of patents not only facilitates transactions with spe-
cialty firms, but actually prompts the formation of such specialty firms. 93
In the GHM model, property rights allow a specialty firm to redeploy a
specialized asset should the contracting firm default on the agreement,
and Merges extends this argument to intellectual property rights. Per-
haps most critically, Merges notes that, unlike the standard GHM model
where the asset developed is tangible, and so has the characteristic of
physical rivalrousness, intellectual property assets are nonrivalrous.94 In
the case of physical property, possession implies exclusion, and the abil-
ity to redeploy the asset. But physical exclusion is frequently impossible
84. Id. at 1491-93.
85. Id. at 1519.
86. Id. at 1516.
87. Id. at 1501.
88. Id. at 1488-89, 1512.
89. Id. at 1505, 1511.
90. Id. at 1509-10.
91. Id. at 1506.
92. See Merges, Intangible Assets, supra note 2.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id. at 16-18.
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for the intangible asset, so that absent legal exclusion, deployment risks
loss of control. And such loss of control precludes the independent exis-
tence of a specialty firm, leaving instead the option of integrating into a
larger firm where loss of control would not be an issue.95
Merges also reviews anecdotal case studies that illustrate his argu-
ments, together with a survey of empirical studies that appear to support
more licensing by specialty firms as patents become available.96 The
overall claims in this work are properly hedged by a number of important
and sophisticated caveats. Merges recognizes certain limitations of the
GHM model, but focuses on the general proposition that residual control
of property is important to the firm.97 He also recognizes that property
rights are not always a panacea, admitting that over-propertization can
sometimes decrease efficiency and musing whether this may not be the
case if residual rights are improperly allocated in the firm.98 In particular,
he notes that efficiency may be decreased where an "anticommons" of
fragmented over-propertization occurs.99
In related work with Ashish Arora, Merges has continued this line
of argument, articulating a model where, under certain conditions, the
availability of strong intellectual property rights will favor independent
suppliers over integrated production."° Arora and Merges develop a
stylized model of supply firm dis-integration, incorporating assumptions
from the literatures on appropriability, transaction cost economics, and
residual property rights. 1 ' They particularly examine supply firm inte-
gration or independence under conditions of information "spillover" or
"leakage" in interfirm transactions, assuming that incentives for innova-
tion are greater for independent supply firms.0 Their model predicts
that where a supply relationship is likely to produce information valuable
to the supplier, the availability of strong intellectual property rights will
favor independent suppliers over integrated production. 3 Significantly,
the model also predicts that where information leakage is present, the ef-
fect of property rights such as patents is ambiguous, and integration
within the firm will be often preferable." But they suggest that the
benefits to innovation of fostering specialized firms must temper the con-
cerns over the proliferation of patents, and particularly concerns over the
creation of a fragmented patent "anticommons."'' 5
95. Id. at 17.
96. See id. at 19-26,36-45; see also Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 456-60, 468-70 (incorporat-
ing case study and empirical survey).
97. Merges, Intangible Assets, supra note 2, at 6-7.
98. Id. at 47--48.
99. Id. at 48.
100. Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 471.
101. Id. at 455.
102. Id. at 454-55.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 466.
105. Id. at 471-72.
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C. Intellectual Property Within the Firm
The literature reviewed above forms the foundation for a newly
emerging body of scholarship on the role of intellectual property in low-
ering the firm's transaction costs. But nearly all of this work has been
targeted toward the interaction between firms, and the decision whether
to "make or buy" a particular specialized input; that is, ultimately,
whether to outsource production or whether to integrate production
within a given firm. But the theory of the firm examines not only the
boundary of the firm looking from the outside in, but also the boundary
of the firm looking from the inside out. Coase and those analysts follow-
ing him offer predictions as to the internal organization of the firm.
Indeed, while securing firm assets against internal hold-up or mis-
appropriation is an important consideration for any type of asset, it may
be particularly important and particularly tricky for intellectual property.
The employee welding fenders onto cars on the assembly plant floor
probably feels little sense of ownership toward the automobiles she is
helping to manufacture, and the right to possession of the physical prod-
uct is relatively clear as between the employee and the firm. But an em-
ployee who makes fundamental new discoveries in chemistry, or who de-
velops a customer list based on personal contacts, may feel a strong
personal entitlement to such intangible properties and may have diffi-
culty separating personal entitlement from that of the firm. In some
cases, the sense of entitlement may be mixed, as perhaps in the case of a
technical writer who feels some pride of authorship in a manual prepared
for the firm, but no sense of ownership in the text produced."°6
Relatively little has been said to date regarding the role of intellec-
tual property rights in shaping such intra-organizational characteristics of
the firm. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky briefly suggest in their paper that
intellectual property law will affect the mobility and incentives of em-
ployees within the firm."07 Robert Merges has argued that strategic bar-
gaining analysis, team production theory, principal-agent theory, and
common sense all argue in favor of default rules that favor firm owner-
ship over employee ownership. 8 And one of us (Burk) has previously
probed the effects that intellectual property may have within the. firm,
helping to secure the firm's intangible assets from misappropriation or
waste, coordinating the use of the firm's intangible assets, and protecting
the firm from employee hold-up when assets have been committed to
specific projects."°
Just as in the case of interfirm transactions, such analysis begins by
analyzing the misappropriation regime of trade secrets, then contrasts
106. In such cases, Burk has suggested that authorship and ownership might be allocated differ-
ently than under current copyright work made-for-hire doctrines. See Burk, supra note 4, at 14-15.
107. See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 5-6.
108. See Merges, supra note 7, at 2-3.
109. See Burk, supra note 4.
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trade secrets with the property-based systems of copyright and patent.
Common flashpoints for trade secrecy disputes are not only the exchange
of information between firms partnering in some venture, but also em-
ployee departures from the firm." ° When employees move between
firms, typically between firms in the same industry, valuable firm infor-
mation may move with them. Courts policing trade secret disputes are
placed in the difficult position of attempting to sort out firm-specific as-
sets from the employee's general human capital; sound policy dictates
that the former sort of information remain with the firm, but the latter
should move freely in the labor market."' Overprotecting the firm's as-
sets risks barring the individual from areas of employment where she is
most skilled and best able to earn a livelihood."' Underprotection of the
firm's assets risks allowing competitors to hire employees away specifi-
cally to misappropriate valuable information.
This creates a type of disclosure paradox paralleling that in negotia-
tions between firms. Employees may have difficulty moving between
firms because trade secrecy or related confidentiality mechanisms pre-
vent them from showing the prospective employer the most creative
work performed for the former employer. Prospective employers may
also be reluctant to hire employees who might inadvertently place the
new employer at risk of actual or apparent trade secret misappropria-
tion." 3 Patent and copyright facilitate the employee's ability to display
creativity and skills to prospective employers in a manner similar to their
enhancement of interfirm production negotiations. The disclosure pro-
tections inherent in patent, or for that matter in copyright, will allow an
employee to display such properties as part of a r~sum6 or portfolio,
without risk that the prospective employer, who may well be a competi-
tor of the employee's previous employer, will misappropriate them. The
property right also helps put prospective employers on notice as to what
assets are considered proprietary to the previous employer.
In previous work, one of us (Burk) has also noted that an important
feature of trade secrecy has been the requirement that firms indicate or
mark information considered proprietary, helping to put employees on
notice as to what is considered a firm-specific asset and assisting courts in
sorting the firm's information from the employee's personal abilities."4
But because trade secrets are difficult to specify, sorting the proprietary
from the nonproprietary is costly and difficult. The impossibility of the
task may well make the social cost of determining what should be pro-
110. 1 MILGRIM, supra note 51, § 5.02.
111. See Kitch, Valuable Information, supra note 46, at 684-85.
112. See Katherine V. W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 742 (2002).
113. See, e.g., Pepsico Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that an em-
ployee hired from a competitor will "inevitably disclose" proprietary information from the previous
employer); see also Stone, supra note 112, at 758 (summarizing inevitable disclosure doctrine).
114. See Burk, supra note 4, at 10.
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tected higher than the social value of the determination, leading to all or
nothing rules of no enforcement at all or complete enforcement.
As in the case of interfirm transactions, exclusive forms of intellec-
tual property can help. First, the nature of the patent itself will tend to
place employees on notice as to the borders of a firm's intellectual assets,
via the same mechanisms that we expect to facilitate interfirm transac-
tions. Notice to the public of a patent's metes and bounds is a black-
letter provision of patent law," 5 but that same notice will serve to alert
employees to the scope of patent assets assigned to the firm. Thus, the
disclosure provisions of the patent statute require that the patent applica-
tion, which will eventually be published when the patent issues, entail a
written description of the invention sufficiently detailed to allow one of
ordinary skill to make and use the invention.116 Similarly, the statute re-
quires that the patent include sufficiently definite claims to allow one of
ordinary skill in the art to know what is covered by the patent."7 To be
sure, language is an imprecise tool, and like any other document, patents
require interpretation."8 Not every ambiguity concerning a patented as-
set will be resolved by the patent disclosure requirements, but it is diffi-
cult to imagine how better to implement a mechanism for demarcating an
intangible asset.
Second, the process of obtaining a patent will tend to demarcate
firm assets from employee assets. Securing a patent requires substantial
sophistication; indeed, some commentators have suggested that the pres-
ence of patents as firm assets constitutes a signal to investors of man-
agement sophistication." 9 As a corollary, the financial investment neces-
sary to draft and prosecute a patent application is not inconsiderable.
Although the financial investment to secure a patent will generally seem
comparatively modest in the context of the financing mechanisms of a
firm, the price of a patent will usually seem more substantial against an
inventor's personal resources. The investment of firm resources in ob-
taining a patent will tend to put employees on notice as to the firm's in-
terest in the patented invention; conversely, employees will typically not
casually or accidentally obtain patent rights in inventions that the firm
considers a firm asset. In cases where the employee does obtain a patent
for work done within the firm, courts will often find that an express or
implied duty gives rise to a "shop right" that allows the employer nonex-
clusive use of the invention. 2°
115. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
116. Id. 1 1.
117. Id. A2.
118. On the ambiguities of claim interpretation, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum
Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIs & CLARK L. REV. 29,32-40 (2005).
119. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 646 n.56, 653 (2002). But see
Meurer, supra note 41, at 747 (disputing the plausibility of patents as a management signal).
120. See Burk, supra note 4, at 16; Merges, supra note 7, at 16.
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In contrast to the formal process of patenting an invention, copy-
right arises spontaneously, upon fixation of a creative work in a tangible
medium of expression, without the necessity of external review or ex-
amination.121 It is unlikely that the firm would wish to assert or retain
rights to every memo, email, or other copyrightable work generated by
employees if a vigorous external review were required; the effort of reg-
istering and policing all these works would be prohibitive. Although
copyright arises automatically, U.S. law currently requires registration
with the Copyright Office before the copyright can be enforced;122 thus
the mechanics of registration can for the most part be ignored unless and
until a justiciable dispute arises. And, where such material is generated
by an employee within the scope of employment, U.S. copyright law
automatically assigns authorship as "work made for hire" to the em-
ployer.Y13 Compared to patentable inventions, the investment in creating
such works is typically relatively small, and the default rule for firm own-
ership is concomitantly stronger than that of the "shop right."
Such rules governing the creation and assignment of patents, copy-
rights, and trade secrets all entail or have evolved to provide significant
employer control of firm-specific intellectual assets, as well as helping to
determine which intellectual assets are firm-specific and which are em-
ployee-specific. Significantly, doctrines such as the "shop right" and
"work made for hire" have developed in reliance on the law of agency
and fiduciary duty. Thus, intellectual property law tends to assign rights
to firms where the ideas are developed within the scope of employment
using firm resources.124
Paul Heald has argued in a similar vein that transaction-cost eco-
nomics can explain many features of patent law, as adjuncts to or re-
placements for corporate forms of firm governance.12 ' Heald focuses on
arguments regarding "asset partitioning" and "team production" costs.
2 6
Some commentators on corporate law have suggested that the corpora-
tion prevents heirs or creditors from claiming assets previously pledged
to firm-specific projects. 7 Heald notes that patent assignments may play
a similar role, particularly given the recordation feature of the patent sys-
tem.12 1 Similarly, recordation of patents may ameliorate costs associated
with team production, that is, the distribution of rewards when work is
done in a team setting. Corporate law commentators have suggested that
the corporate form provides a neutral overseer to distribute rewards, or
121. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
122. Id. § 411.
123. Id. § 201(b).
124. See Burk, supra note 4, at 17-18.
125. See Heald, supra note 6.
126. See id.
127. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387, 394 (2000).
128. See Heald, supra note 6, at 482.
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to deter shirking in cooperative work. 129 Heald has argued that patenting
reduces costs of monitoring and tracking employee work augmenting the
benefits of corporate organization. 3'
These applications of intellectual property are largely consonant
with the various forms of business association law that address similar is-
sues.' People working for a principal, a partnership, a corporation, or
so on, often face the question of whether they can pursue a business op-
portunity on their own or must instead offer it to the business for which
they work. This was the situation at issue in perhaps the most famous fi-
duciary duty case of all, Meinhard v. Salmon.'32 Two joint venturers
leased and managed a hotel in New York, with one providing money and
the other doing the work.'33 When the time came for renewal, the latter
wound up striking a deal with the property owner without involving his
partner in the new deal.' The question was whether this was an oppor-
tunity that belonged to the partnership, and hence should have been pre-
sented to it.'
35
Judge Cardozo answered yes, in classic language: "A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior.' ' 36 Crucial to the decision was the fact that this oppor-
tunity concerned the very property that was at the heart of the partner-
ship.137  "If Salmon had received from Gerry a proposition to lease a
building at a location far removed, he might have held for himself the
privilege thus acquired, or so we shall assume. Here the subject-matter
of the new lease was an extension and enlargement of the subject-matter
of the old one.' '1 3
8
Corporate law draws a similar line. The leading case on the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine is Guth v. Loft.'39 The Guth rule states:
[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business
opportunity which the corporation is financially able to undertake,
is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation's business and is of
129. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999).
130. See Heald, supra note 6, at 492. Heald may be overly optimistic about the efficacy of patent-
ing in monitoring employee output. See Burk, supra note 4, at 18-19 (noting the difficulty of deter-
mining patent inventorship in large R&D operations). In drawing upon team production theory,
Heald also runs the risk of inheriting the difficulty in explaining why mediating hierarchs have ade-
quate incentive to manage the affairs of the business in an energetic, competent, and honest way.
131. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1444-47 (2002). Smith's application of the theory of the firm to fiduciary duties has clear
implications for trade secrecy. See Burk, supra note 4, at 4.
132. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
133. Id. at 546.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 548.
138. Id.
139. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
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practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an in-
terest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportu-
nity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into
conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him to
seize the opportunity for himself.'"
The Guth corollary states:
It is true that when a business opportunity comes to a corporate of-
ficer or director in his individual capacity rather than in his official
capacity, and the opportunity is one which, because of the nature of
the enterprise, is not essential to his corporation, and is one in
which it has no interest or expectancy, the officer or director is enti-
tled to treat the opportunity as his own, and the corporation has no
interest in it, if, of course, the officer or director has not wrongfully
embarked the corporation's resources therein.'41
Thus, two crucial factors are whether the employee learned about the
opportunity while at work, and whether she used corporate resources in
developing the opportunity. 42 The line strongly resembles that of the
work for hire doctrine, and again shows courts moving toward the de-
marcation line of asset specificity.'43
Business law has also dealt with the question of how agents may use
confidential information that they have gained while working for a prin-
cipal. The basic rule is that they cannot use such information without the
principal's consent. The rule is strictest while the agent remains an
agent:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the princi-
pal not to use or to communicate information confidentially given
him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on
account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in com-
petition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or
on behalf of another, although such information does not relate to
the transaction in which he is then employed, unless the informa-
tion is a matter of general knowledge.1"
Note that this covers confidential information acquired "during the
course of or on account of his agency"' 45 -again, pointing to resources
acquired within the scope of employment.
140. Id. at 511.
141. Id. at 510-11.
142. For further analysis of the corporate opportunity doctrine, see Eric Talley, Turning Servile
Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277
(1998), and Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94
HARV. L. REV. 998 (1981). Talley's analysis in particular is quite pertinent for our discussion in this
article.
143. See Burk, supra note 4, at 18.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
145. Id.
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There is somewhat less restriction on using confidential information
after the agent has ceased being an agent, but there are still some signifi-
cant limits.
Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency, the
agent.., has a duty to the principal not to use or to disclose to third
persons, on his own account or on account of others, in competition
with the principal or to his injury, trade secrets, written lists of
names, or other similar confidential matters given to him only for
the principal's use or acquired by the agent in violation of duty.
The agent is entitled to use general information concerning the
method of business of the principal and the names of the customers
retained in his memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as
agent .... 146
Here again, information that is specific to the principal is protected,
while general information is not.
Thus, agency and corporate law generally resemble intellectual
property law in how they divide rights to information generated within a
firm. That line is close to what one would expect from the theory of the
firm: information whose usefulness is specific to the firm belongs to the
firm, while employees can use for themselves more general informa-
tion.147 We would like to believe that these different areas of the law
have developed the same distinctions because they track the most effi-
cient rule, although it is also possible that courts and legislators creating
intellectual property law simply drew upon the well-known and well-
established principles of agency law, so that the intellectual property
rules are not separate confirmation of the good qualities of the rules.
A different pattern emerges as we move from the rules initially as-
signing property rights between firms and their members to the rules that
govern how those rights can be reassigned. Here, the rules of intellectual
property law function rather differently from those of business associa-
tion law. The differences make sense given the different purposes of the
two sets of laws. In brief, intellectual property law makes transfer of
rights relatively easy to accomplish, whereas business association law
creates higher hurdles for certain transfers, particularly transfers of rights
to the directors, officers, or controlling shareholders of corporations.
These hurdles exist to control conflicts of interest, which are a central
concern of business association law.
Complying with the rules for transferring rights under the intellec-
tual property laws is relatively straightforward; in general, intellectual
property is alienable and devisable by contract or other operation of law,
as any other property. In a few instances, the statute places explicit re-
strictions on transfers-for example, copyright requires a signed writing
in order to transfer exclusive rights, so that transfer by implied license or
146. Id. § 396(b).
147. See Smith, supra note 131, at 1419.
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contracts implied in fact are limited to nonexclusive rights. 4 ' The patent
statute includes a recordation provision that secures the priority of regis-
tered patent assignments.149 The copyright statue contains a similar rec-
ordation provision. 15 In some cases, the policies animating such formali-
ties are clear; for example, Congress has created an unwaiveable
reversionary interest in the transfer of exclusive rights in order to protect
unwary authors-somewhat paternalistically-against overreaching li-
censes.
151
Agency and corporate law may for their own purposes create
greater obstacles to transfers of intellectual property rights, depending
upon circumstances and to whom the rights are being transferred.
Whenever rights are being transferred from a principal to an agent, or
from a corporation to a director, officer, or employee, fiduciary duty
rules apply, and they may create significant limits on the transfer.'52 Fi-
duciary duty rules apply to the use of corporate opportunities or the use
of confidential information. 153 They also apply to the licensing of intel-
lectual property rights just discussed, where a principal is on one side and
her agent on the other.154
Such transactions require approval by the principal, in the case of
agency law,'55 or of the corporation, in the case of corporate law.'56 The
procedural stringency imposed on such consent depends on circum-
stances. Under basic agency law, the main requirement is that the prin-
cipal must be fully informed of all relevant material information that the
agent possesses concerning the transaction.'57
An agent who, to the knowledge of the principal, acts on his own
account in a transaction in which he is employed has a duty to deal
fairly with the principal and to disclose to him all facts which the
agent knows or should know would reasonably affect the principal's
judgment, unless the principal has manifested that he knows such
facts or that he does not care to know them."5
This strong information requirement goes beyond the standard contrac-
tual principle of good faith that governs licensing under the intellectual
property laws. The fairness requirement in the quoted language also
goes beyond ordinary good faith.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000).
149. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c); Quality Records, Inc. v. Coast to Coast Music Inc., Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) 27,659 (9th Cir. 1997).
151. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,220-21 (1990).
152. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389, 395, 396 (1958); FRANKLIN A.
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW §§ 4.2.4-.2.9 (2000).
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395,396 (use of confidential information).
154. See id. § 389 (acting as an adverse party).
155. See id. §§ 390, 395 cmt. c.
156. See GEVURTZ, supra note 152, § 4.2.9(b), at 386.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. a.
158. Id. § 390.
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For transactions within a corporation, the procedural requirements
can be stronger, depending on the party with whom the corporation is
transacting. Requirements are simplest for transactions with simple em-
ployees. For these, approval by a superior with the required authority
following full disclosure should generally suffice.'59
Transactions with directors, top officers, or controlling shareholders
face greater obstacles. For these, there is something of a puzzle as to
whose approval should count as blessing the transaction. The board of
directors formally controls a corporation; therefore, if a transaction in-
volves a party with ties to one or more of the directors, can we trust the
board to act in the best interests of the corporation? Corporate law has
developed a three-pronged approach: self-dealing transactions are valid
if one of three tests is met. The transaction must be approved, following
full disclosure, by a majority of the independent and disinterested direc-
tors, or by a majority of the disinterested shareholders, or must be shown
to be fair to the corporation."6 The same basic rule probably applies to
officers as well.16'
Corporate law also creates special procedures for transactions with
shareholders who control the board, but do not own all of the corpora-
tion's shares.162  The concern here is that the controlling shareholder
could get the board to approve a transaction that benefits the share-
holder at the expense of minority shareholders. In Delaware, as in many
states, such a transaction must be shown to be fair to the corporation. 63
Approval by independent directors or shareholders simply shifts the
burden of proof on fairness."
Thus, agency and corporate law apply procedural limits on transfers
of property rights from a firm to its agents that go beyond the transfer
rules of intellectual property law. Why is this so? Such transfers create
potential conflicts of interest between firms and their members. One of
the key functions of agency and corporation law is to address such con-
flicts. The law attempts to do so in a way that protects firms from possi-
ble exploitation by their agents while still providing plenty of flexibility
for private ordering. Intellectual property law rules apply not just to
such intrafirm transactions, but also to interfirm transactions where such
conflicts are generally not present and bargaining occurs at arms-length.
For those transactions, fiduciary duty rules are unnecessary. Thus, we
need not have the same legal protections for such transactions. The in-
tellectual property rules, which apply to both, thus set a minimal level of
procedure required to effect a valid transfer, and we use agency and cor-
159. See GEVURTZ, supra note 152, § 4.2.
160. See DEL. CODE ANN. § 144 (2006); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 8.60-63 (2003).
161. See GEVURTZ, supra note 152, § 4.2.1, at 324.
162. See id. § 4.2.4, at 346.
163. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
164. See id.
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porate law to provide greater protections in transactions where such pro-
tection is useful.
III. CONSIDERING VARIETIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Our discussion to this point has summarized and extended the
analysis of intellectual property and the firm. The previous analyses we
have discussed tended to focus on the contrast between the transaction
cost profiles of trade secrets and patents; relatively little has been said
about other forms of intellectual property, such as copyright.'65 But in
exploring the role of intellectual property vis-A-vis the firm, it quickly be-
comes clear that firms hold intellectual property in multiple forms, not
only patents, but also copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, and other va-
rieties. Why might firms hold multiple forms of intellectual property,
and what effect do they have on the internal and external transaction
costs of the firm? In this Part we consider several examples of the role
that different types of intellectual property may play in transactions be-
tween firms, as well as transactions within firms. As previous commenta-
tors have done, we begin with the characteristics of trade secrecy.
A. Considering "Strong" Intellectual Property
Arrow's information disclosure paradox suggests that firms will
have difficulty licensing information due to the possibility of misappro-
priation;" employee access to valuable information generates similar
dangers to the firm. An obvious first attempt to solve these problems
might be for parties to require confidentiality as a matter of contract, or
to impose a duty of confidentiality sounding in tort or unjust enrichment.
These are the origins of trade secrecy, which provides some degree of
remedy to the misappropriation of valuable business information.1 67
But trade secrecy does not confer a true property right in the sense
that it confers no right to exclude third parties from the subject matter of
the secret.168 In particular, independent development and reverse engi-
neering are legitimate methods to acquire the trade secret.1 69  Conse-
quently, the holder of the trade secret has no ability to exclude inde-
165. An exception is the intrafirm analysis in Burk, supra note 4.
166. See Heald, supra note 6, at 494.
167. See Richard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law After Ke-
wanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 927, 937-38 (1974) (reviewing the common law bases of trade secrecy).
168. See Friedman et al., supra note 47, at 62 (defining trade secrecy as a liability rule regime).
Traditionally, courts explicitly rejected classification of trade secrets as property. See RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939); E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102
(1917). More recent cases tend toward the view of trade secrets as property. See Pamela Samuelson,
Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual
Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 366 (1989).
169. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. commentary; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
cmt. a (1939).
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pendent developers or reverse engineers from using the information. 7'
Perhaps more important, the holder of the trade secret has no ability to
promise a licensee that independent developers or reverse engineers will
not begin to use the trade secret. 7' Rather, when the information is not
generally known in the industry and the holder of the information takes
reasonable steps against public disclosure, trade secrecy confers protec-
tion against certain types of misappropriation.
17 2
The practical result of this system is that the licensee of a trade se-
cret is really bargaining for disclosure, rather than for exclusivity.173
These features of trade secrecy also place a natural limit on the price that
can be charged for access to a trade secret; the price must be something
less than the cost to the licensee of reverse engineering or independently
developing the information. 74 Consequently, the price paid for the dis-
closure of the trade secret will be essentially the value that the licensee
receives from the "head start" of disclosure, rather than having to incur
the costs of independent development. And as a corollary, not surpris-
ingly, this is the most common measure of damages in cases of trade se-
cret misappropriation: a damages award or an injunction equivalent to
the monetary or temporal "head start" that the rogue competitor ob-
tained by misappropriation.175
As a consequence of these features, Kitch, Merges, and others point
out that the combination of contract, quasi-contract, and tort that com-
prises trade secret law offers some degree of protection against misap-
propriation of project-specific assets, but this protection is problematic
and often incomplete.176 From this they argue the utility, and indeed the
necessity, of stronger intellectual property regimes.77 Reviewing such
analyses, one might conclude that it is nearly impossible for firms to ex-
change information that is unprotected by a strong property regime.
We note as an initial matter that practical experience proves this
supposition to be as wrong as wrong can be. Firms can and do routinely
exchange unpatented information. To be sure, there are risks in doing
so, and managers of a firm are aware of such risks, although managers
often seem somewhat less exercised about the risks than are the firm's
lawyers. Indeed, anecdote, experience, and ethnography remind us that
such exchanges frequently occur on the basis of no more than a hand-
170. See 2 MILGRIM, supra note 51, § 7.02[1][a] & n.1.
171. Id. § 7.02 [1][c].
172. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757.
173. See 2 MILGRIM, supra note 51, § 7.02[1][c].
174. Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory
Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 981-82 (1977).
175. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr §§ 2 cmt., 3 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433,449 (1990).
176. See Kitch, Valuable Information, supra note 46, at 689-708; Merges, Intangible Assets, supra
note 2, at 6-7.
177. See Kitch, Valuable Information, supra note 46, at 709-10; Merges, Intangible Assets, supra
note 2, at 8.
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shake or verbal agreement. 178. Cases of bargaining breach or breakdown,
such as those surveyed by Merges, are likely the exception-of the mil-
lions of business transactions that occur each year, it is unclear how many
result in disputes, but it seems safe to say that few of those disputes result
in litigation. Relatively few disputes are resolved by formal legal mecha-
nisms; very few of the cases filed in court proceed to trial, fewer proceed
to appeal, and fewer yet are reported as published opinions. 79
Thus, conclusions drawn from a survey of the case law must be ap-
proached with caution. Only the most pathological situations are re-
ported as judicial opinions; the majority have settled or reached some
other resolution. Settlement and other informal dispute resolutions may
of course be helped along by the presence of property rights or other
clear entitlements; parties are more likely to reach agreement where
their estimates of cost and benefit are aligned. But informal resolutions
may be primarily facilitated by the norms and relationships of the busi-
ness community. Firms are most often repeat players. Bargaining in the
marketplace is a multi-round game rather than a single shot, and there
are likely to be substantial reputational penalties for "defecting" from
the game by misappropriating intellectual property. This is particularly
true in concentrated industries, where opportunities for partnerships are
limited, and today's competitor may be tomorrow's essential resource.
Consequently, we must be modest about the role of property rights
or any other formal legal mechanisms in encouraging interfirm transac-
tions; they may operate mostly in the background, and may mostly affect
the marginal case. Moreover, nonlegal mechanisms differ over space and
across time, and the optimal law may vary depending on the nonlegal
mechanisms. Given that caveat, we cannot lightly dismiss the role of
contract-based legal protections to interfirm transactions. Backed by the
norms and informal expectations of the community, we suggest that the
law of contract, unjust enrichment, and trade secrets provide rather sig-
nificant legal deterrents to misappropriation of nonpatented information.
Professor Merges emphasizes that these legal mechanisms sometimes fail
and surveys a number of cases illustrating such failures. 8 ° But such re-
178. See Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation:
Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116, 120 (1996).
179. For evidence that most grievances never result in a legal claim, and that most legal claims do
not result in a contested judgment, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 135-37 (2002). For evidence that only about a fifth of judgments undergo an
appeal, see id. at 151-52. For evidence that nearly 80% of federal court opinions are unpublished, see
Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulations, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 743, 772 (2006).
180. In touting patents as a preferable alternative, Merges largely neglects the converse problem,
which is nonetheless pertinent: patents and their attendant licenses also sometimes fail. In fact, the
patent system to some extent relies upon such failures as opportunities to weed out weak patents, en-
couraging licensees to challenge and invalidate patents, on the theory that there are few potential chal-
lengers who have better information and better incentives to identify bad patents than their licensees.
See, e.g., Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671-74 (1969); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
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ported cases are the merest tip of the iceberg of business experience, and
it bears remembering that these legal mechanisms also often succeed.
Simply the threat of litigation, with its attendant costs and inconven-
iences, may be enough to deter defections where the payoff for strategic
behavior is relatively low.
Nonetheless, there are undoubtedly situations where trade secrecy
proves inadequate, and doubtless situations where bargains do not occur
because firms know that trade secrecy may be inadequate. Thus, the pre-
vious analyses by Merges, by Merges and Arora, and by Bar-Gill and
Parchomovsky consider, and clearly favor, provision of what they desig-
nate as "strong" intellectual property rights.18' Patents appear to be their
paradigm for such rights, set in opposition to trade secrets or purely con-
tractual restrictions, which, lacking the right to exclude, cannot properly
be considered property rights at all. Yet beyond the obvious contempla-
tion of patents, none of these previous discussions articulate what exactly
is meant by "strong" property rights, even though such rights are thought
to lead to desirable efficiencies in interfirm transactions.
In previous work, Burk has analyzed what may be meant by
"strong" property rights in the literature that uses such terms, concluding
that this nomenclature typically involves a confluence of at least three
aspects of property rights, each of which exists on a continuum of possi-
ble legal formulations."8 2 First, discussions of "strong" property tend to
contemplate property as designated in the nomenclature famously devel-
oped by Calabresi and Melamed.'83 In this framework, property entails a
robust right to exclude, as opposed to a liability regime that would con-
template a right to recover damages.1" Patents are indeed the paradigm
case for intellectual property in this dimension, as they are couched in
terms of exclusive rights 85 and carry with them strong injunctive reme-
dies. 86 Other forms of intellectual property, particularly copyright, may
also carry exclusive rights and injunctive remedies, but incorporate as-
pects of liability regimes, such as compulsory licensing.'87 Consequently,
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (licensee challenge to patent validity presents a case or controversy for declara-
tory judgment).
181. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 471-72; Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 2;
Merges, Intangible Assets, supra note 2, at 32.
182. See Burk, Muddy Rules, supra note 57, at 129-30.
183. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 66.
184. Id. at 1107.
185. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
186. See 35 U.S.C. § 283. The Federal Circuit has gone so far as to proclaim that a permanent
injunction is to be the routine, if not mandatory, remedy for patent infringement. See eBay v. Merc-
Exchange, LLC, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This proclamation, however, was later rejected
by the Supreme Court. See eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (holding that patent injunc-
tions are subject to the usual considerations of equitable remedies).
187. For example, copyright is subject to compulsory licensing for "cover" recordings of musical
compositions, 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000), and for certain statutorily compliant digital transmissions of
sound recordings, 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2). Additionally, many of the user privileges and exemptions in
the copyright statute, such as the "fair use" provisions, can be considered compulsory licenses at a zero
royalty. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REv. 99, 158 (2000).
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these forms of intellectual property may be considered less "strong" than
patents, which are largely free of liability regimes.
Second, "strong" property rights tend to be envisioned as relatively
clear or bright-line ownership rules, as opposed to fact-specific standards
that are muddier.1" Clarity or ambiguity as to ownership may arise ei-
ther in delineating the parameters of the protected subject matter, or in
specifying the circumstances under which the right can be invoked. Here
again, patents tend to be the paradigm case for strength. Patent law de-
votes considerable attention to placing the public on notice of the metes
and bounds of the protected invention, attempting to spell out the exact
character of the protected invention in a detailed document.1"9 Although
such written limitations cannot resolve every uncertainty, the boundaries
of the patent strive towards the highest degree of clarity that the inherent
ambiguities of text allow."9 With relatively few exceptions, patent law
tends to be equally precise on circumstances that constitute infringement
of the patent. 9 I Copyright protection, on the other hand, is subject to a
considerable degree of case-by-case muddiness both in determining the
bounds of the protected work, and with regard to when exclusivity may
be invoked.'"
Finally, "strong" property rights tend to be conceived as complete
rather than divided entitlements, that is, as grants of sole or unitary privi-
lege to exercise the right, rather than as grants under which access to or
use of the protected subject matter must be shared. Patent law again
constitutes the intellectual property paradigm in this dimension; although
patent rights may overlap, each right holder enjoys a complete exclusive
right, allowing the holders of overlapping rights to exclude one an-
other-a situation of "blocking" patents.193 Patents entail almost no ex-
ceptions or exemptions to exclusivity.194 Copyright, by contrast, is rid-
188. See Burk, Muddy Rules, supra note 57, at 130-31.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
190. Which is to say, of course, that ultimately there may still be a great deal of ambiguity in the
text. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 33 (noting the unavoidable ambiguities in interpreting
patent texts). This is not to say that the ex post interpreter has unfettered discretion in determining
the meaning of the patent claims, but simply to acknowledge Northrop Frye's warning that "[readers]
are not observers, but participants, and have to guard against not only the illusion of detached objec-
tivity, but its opposite, the counsel of despair that suggests that all reading is narcissism, seeing every
text as only a mirror reflecting our own psyches." NORTHROP FRYE, WORDS WITH POWER: BEING A
SECOND STUDY OF THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE 75 (1990).
191. See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
192. For example, the defense of fair use constitutes a classic "standards" based ex post balancing
test of circumstantial factors. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Stan-
dards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 550 (2005) (discussing fair
use as a standard).
193. See Lemley, supra note 69, at 991; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargain-
ing Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75,81 (1994).
194. The U.S. patent statute contains minor exemptions for compulsory licensing of civilian nu-
clear devices, 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000), and environmental pollution control, 42 U.S.C. § 7608, as well
as exceptions for surgical processes, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), and development of generic drug regulatory
data, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). A common law exception for experimental uses of the patented invention
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died with a vast and confusing array of exemptions and user privileges
that allow numerous parties special license to encroach upon the prop-
erty right under particular circumstances.195
B. Beyond Strong Intellectual Property
These aspects of property strength, particularly as applied to pat-
ents, appear consistent with the usage of the "strong property" designa-
tor in the prior literature on intellectual property and the firm. The pre-
vious literature in fact largely focuses on industries such as biotechnology
or small-molecule chemistry where patents are the primary mode of in-
tellectual property protection.'9 6 But even though much of the focus in
previous analyses has been on patents and trade secrets, we note that the
same situation obtains in industries that are highly copyright depend-
ent-not only technological or industrial businesses, such as the software
industry, but also in the entertainment industries. Entertainment ven-
tures such as a major theater production or motion picture may be com-
plex, capital intensive, and may involve a large number of specialized
production functions. Production of a motion picture may be conceived
as a process of coordinating multiple specialized inputs: script writing,
musical composition and recording, casting, costuming, cinematography,
film and sound editing, sound mixing, special effects, and so on. For a
motion picture studio, the choice whether to develop such expertise-
such as casting-in-house or to contract functions-such as special ef-
fects-out to a specialty firm, is the Coasean choice."9
Property rights in such artistic or entertainment products may also
serve to streamline negotiations, although the copyrights that will most
often be at issue in these industries have a different property configura-
tion than that of patent. To continue with the motion picture example, a
specialty firm that contracts to produce special effects footage faces the
classic hold-up problem once it begins to perform: the trading partner
may attempt to extort additional concessions after its assets are specifi-
cally dedicated to the project.198 Copyright confers residual rights in the
asset, allowing the specialty firm to redeploy the asset, at least to the ex-
has been historically narrow, and may have been largely obliterated by recent Federal Circuit deci-
sions. See Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
195. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110-115 (detailing various statutory exceptions and exemptions to the
exclusive rights of copyright holders).
196. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 456-59; Merges, Intangible Assets, supra note 2, at 19-
26,36-45.
197. However, even taking into consideration the motion picture industry's penchant for narcissis-
tic films about the making of films, see, e.g., TRISTRAM SHANDY: A COCK AND BULL STORY (2005);
THE FRENCH LIEUTENANT'S WOMAN (1981), we do not anticipate seeing any time soon a major mo-
tion picture on the economics of Hollywood entitled Coase's Choice.
198. For an example of exactly such a hold-up situation, see Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908
F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991), in which a low-budget horror filmmaker
refused to pay as contracted for special effects footage of alien frozen yogurt.
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tent that an asset as specific as special effects footage for a given film can
be redeployed.'99
However, it is important to consider that copyright prohibits only
copying, and certain other acts closely related to the disposition of copies
of the protected work. e° In other words, copyright does not provide
rights against the world, only against copyists. Consequently, copyright
provides an intermediate form of intellectual property poised between
the anti-misappropriation regime of trade secrecy and the exclusionary
regime of patent. Copyright is available to rights holders without trade
secrecy's burdensome apparatus of nondisclosure agreements and con-
tractual protection, and provides a measure of safety in disclosure. Like
patent, it penalizes certain uses of valuable information that has been
disclosed to the world. But unlike patent law, copyright law contains a
mixture of property and liability rules with numerous exceptions and ex-
emptions, and so does not provide a complete exclusive right. Rather,
like trade secrecy, copyright infringement still requires misappropriation,
that is, access to and prohibited use of the protected information, before
penalties are incurred.
Indeed, much as in trade secrecy, independent development of a
substantially similar work is not excluded by copyright.2"' Additionally,
as copyright has increasingly been applied to technical subject matter,
courts have adapted the copyright fair use doctrine, which allows users
under some conditions to make unauthorized use of all or part of a pro-
tected work, into an effective reverse engineering right.2"2 Specifically,
courts have repeatedly held that unauthorized intermediate copying may
be fair if the purpose is to extract public domain elements from the cop-
ied work, and if commercialization of the intermediate copy itself is not
the purpose of the reproduction.0 3 This holding has been repeatedly
reached to allow, for example, decompilation of copyrighted software for
analysis in order to develop interoperable or competing products.2°4
199. See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 559 ("Effects may license, sell, or give away, for nothing its
remaining rights in the special effects footage. Those rights may not be particularly valuable, of
course.., it remains to be seen whether there's a market for shots featuring great gobs of alien yogurt
oozing out of a defunct factory.").
200. Specifically, in addition to the exclusive right to reproduce the work, copyright also confers
the exclusive right to adapt the work, to distribute copies of the work, and for certain types of works,
the exclusive rights to publicly perform, publicly display, and digitally transmit the work. See 17
U.S.C. § 106.
201. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,54 (2d Cir. 1936).
202. Sony Computer Entm't v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega En-
ters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1513-17 (9th Cir. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
203. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering,
and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975, 993 (1994); J. H. Reichman, Design Protection and
the New Technologies: The United States Experience in Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV.
6, 143-44 (1989).
204. Sony, 203 F.3d at 599-601; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514-15; Atari, 975 F.2d at 835-37.
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Thus, each of the permissible routes for permissible appropriation of a
trade secret is available in copyright law as well.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that copyright is the form of
intellectual property most compatible with parallel trade secrecy.
Whereas the patent applicant must make an election, choosing between
maintaining the invention as a trade secret or disclosing it to the public in
return for patent protection, owners of copyright need not make such an
election. Copyright attaches at the moment that the original, intellectual
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, regardless of whether
the work is ever published.0 5 Indeed, unpublished works may receive
some additional protective consideration under copyright, as the choice
of when to release the work to the public is an important right to be re-
served to the copyright holder.2" Copyright thus creates some degree of
incentive for disclosure, but can operate in situations where appropriabil-
ity concerns militate in favor of confidentiality. In other words, copy-
right occupies an intermediate position between the disclosure regime of
patent exclusivity and the misappropriation regime of trade secrecy.
This intermediate position is underscored by the evidentiary struc-
ture of copyright. To show that impermissible copying has occurred,
copyright holders must prove both an actual physical act of copying, and
also that the copying took legally protected content. 7 Although the
former element might be shown by direct evidence, such evidence is rare.
Thus, actual copying is instead frequently shown by circumstantial evi-
dence: evidence of access to the work that would have allowed copying,
and similarities between the protected work and the allegedly infringing
work that would allow an inference of copying. In some cases, the simi-
larities between the two works can be so striking or surprising that access
is presumed. But because both independent development-that is, crea-
tion of a similar work without actual copying-and reverse engineering-
that is, actual copying that took no legally protected content-are per-
missible under copyright, proof of copyright infringement may be con-
siderably more difficult than it would be under a property regime such as
patent."'
The practical result in the case of copyright is that publication-that
is, public disclosure-of a copyrighted work creates a strong presumption
against an accused infringer, but not an insurmountable presumption.
The proof required to show the elements of copyright infringement is
frequently minimal, but can be rebutted by the accused infringer who is
205. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
206. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552-53 (1985). Specifi-
cally, this consideration is factored in under the fair use analysis, although the copyright statute pre-
vents it from becoming dispositive. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
208. There may of course be considerable, very expensive, wrangling in a patent dispute over the
borders of the exclusive right, but with regard to the invention covered by the claims there are effec-
tively no excuses or exemptions to the owner's right.
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sufficiently rigorous in documenting development. 29 For example, in the
software context, potential defendants may document development in
such a way as to be able to rebut a claim of actual copying, such as using
"clean room techniques" to prove copy-free development. 210 Thus, copy-
right effectively shifts the burden of proving permissible use to the ac-
cused infringer, and allows independent development of the information
at the cost of disproving copying. The presumption favors publication or
disclosure of the creative work, but attached to a regime of misappro-
priation rather than one of full exclusivity.
Copyright protection as well as patent protection, then, encourages
disclosure of valuable information, alleviating or solving the information
disclosure paradox for licensing as well as for employee mobility. But
why then is the subject matter of trade secrecy left at the mercy of high
transactions costs? Trade secrets are valuable and frequently critical in-
formation to the functioning of firms, and are likely to be among the
most firm-specific of intellectual assets-specialized processes, customer
lists, business plans, and other information integral to the firm.21' To lose
a trade secret is often tantamount to losing the firm. Why then do they
not receive a strong, or at least stronger, measure of intellectual property
protection?
Although there may be doctrinal reasons that trade secrets are not
so protected,"' we suggest that among the defensible policy reasons for
assigning them to a "weak" and costly misappropriation regime is their
relationship to transaction costs within and between firms. Trade secrecy
covers the broadest and most inchoate subject matter of intellectual as-
sets; as Arora and Merges have pointed out, the confidentiality mecha-
nisms of trade secrecy are expensive in part because these assets are so
difficult to define. 213  This association of trade secrets with relatively in-
choate subject matter is, we believe, no accident. Trade secrets tend to
209. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1231, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2002).
210. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308,2317-18 n.24 (1994). Even if evidence of independent development is
available, though, there is some risk, as in the case of the famous suit against George Harrison by the
Chiffons for infringement of their song "He's So Fine." Although Harrison was able to show evidence
of independent development of his allegedly infringing song "My Sweet Lord," the jury found in-
fringement on the theory that Harrison had likely heard the Chiffon composition on the radio or else-
where and subconsciously copied it. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F.
Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
211. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT
§ 1(4) (1985), available at http://www.wipo.intlclealdocs-new/pdflenlus/usO34en.pdf.
212. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the federal constitution requires patentable
subject matter to be nonobvious, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), and copyrightable
subject matter to be original, see Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Other
valuable information may be covered by trade secrecy to the extent that it does not interfere with the
goals of the federal intellectual property system, see Kewanee v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). But such a recital of doctrine of
course begs the question as to why intellectual property protection should be divided up in this fash-
ion.
213. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 461,470.
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encompass not only those knowledge assets most likely to be firm-
specific, but also those most likely to be indistinguishable from an em-
ployee's general human capital.
There is strong evidence that industries benefit where employers
forgo specification and enforcement of trade secrets, allowing employees
to move freely between firms in "high velocity" employment markets.1 4
We suggest that trade secrecy is properly risky and costly, as a deterrent
to excessive use of a protective mode that hampers employee mobility
and is costly to society. Thus, from the standpoint of employee incentive
and mobility, trade secrecy is not only the most expensive method of pro-
tection, but should properly be the most expensive method of protection,
as it is the method including forms of intellectual capital most likely to
become commingled or indistinguishable from the skills or knowledge of
an employee. And, indeed, much of the burden of trade secret protec-
tion stems from legal requirements pushing back against intellectual
commingling, prompting the employer to demarcate those intellectual
assets considered to be proprietary and firm specific.
Overuse of trade secrecy is also discouraged via the patent system.
As a matter of federal policy, the patent system entails significant penal-
ties for using trade secrecy when a patent was available-holders of pat-
entable trade secrets not only lose their opportunity to obtain a patent
themselves,215 but also may have the secret patented out from under
them, as the patent statute will award the patent to a later inventor who
applies for a patent on the invention, rewarding the choice to use the
patent system.216 Inventors who opt for trade secrecy run a significant
risk of paying royalties on the secret to a later patentee.
This pushes intellectual property owners toward more exclusive
protection whenever possible. These stronger forms of intellectual prop-
erty protection tend to be associated with more defined and definable as-
sets. Both patent and copyright entail default rules that facilitate segre-
gation of firm-specific assets from employee skills. Patents are directed
to subject matter that can meet relatively high standards of definition,217
subject to a stringent requirement of written description, 218 and to de-
marcation in definite claims.219 Failure to adequately describe an inven-
tion in a patent specification, or to characterize the invention in suffi-
ciently definite claims, results in an invalid patent.220 Such discrete
technological entities can typically be segregated from an employee's
214. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); ANNALEE SAXANIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE
AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); see also infra notes 256-57 and ac-
companying text.
215. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
216. See W.L. Gore & Assocs. Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
217. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
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general skills. Copyright, too, is directed to relatively discrete works
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.221 Although copyrightable ex-
pression may to some extent be commingled with the reputational capital
of the creator, copyright rests on the assumption that the forms of ex-
pression are essentially infinite, and even if past expressions of an idea
are owned by an assignee, so long as ideas remain unprotected, crea-
tors-including employees-will yet have myriad variations in which to
express themselves.222
Thus, we suggest that the relative expense of employing these vari-
ous modes of intellectual property protection is at least roughly commen-
surate with their ratio of cost to benefit in lowering firm transaction
costs. And, congruent -with our view, it is important to realize that the
provision of patents to resolve Arrow's information disclosure paradox
simultaneously resolves another disclosure paradox identified by Richard
Stern many years ago. 23 Patents are classically conceived as a quid pro
quo in which the inventor swaps a limited term of protection, about
twenty years, for public disclosure of his invention.24 But trade secrecy
lasts indefinitely, so long as the invention remains secret. Given that a
rational inventor would prefer perpetual protection rather than twenty
years of protection, inventions that can likely be kept secret for longer
than twenty years would never be patented. Indeed, one might expect
that the only inventions that would be patented are those that would be
reverse engineered or independently discovered in less than twenty
years. So why offer twenty years of exclusive rights, and the potential at-
tendant disutility of monopoly pricing, in return for the disclosure of in-
ventions that in due course would be disclosed anyway?
The rationale for offering patents makes greater sense if disclosure
for purposes of bargaining is the point of the patent, rather than disclo-
sure to increase public knowledge. Rational trade secret holders might
choose to keep their technology as trade secrets in perpetuity unless they
hope to license them, and then the very significant impediments to such
licensing might make the patent system attractive. Thus, the benefit to
the public of offering patents for inventions that might otherwise be kept
as trade secrets is the increase in interfirm disclosures and the increase in
employee mobility by encouraging disclosure and demarcation of the
firm's intellectual assets.
221. Id.
222. The limitations on this assumption are perhaps most problematic where the style of expres-
sion by an artist resembles past expression assigned to a former employer, creating a potential in-
fringement under the doctrine of "substantial similarity." See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wild-
life Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Cal.
1987). Courts have properly interpreted and applied this doctrine more loosely in such cases, so as to
shield the ability of artists to create future works in a particular individual style.
223. See Stern, supra note 167, at 958.
224. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
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C. Some Additional Aspects of Legal Protection
We have now considered several examples of how intellectual prop-
erty affects transaction costs within and between firms, and these exam-
ples, displaying the relative strengths and costs of different types of intel-
lectual property, indicate that "strong" intellectual property is not the
only game in town. Even though patents are undoubtedly important and
desirable in many instances, the operation of other forms of intellectual
property such as copyright and trade secrecy can in many other instances
serve to facilitate interfirm bargains and secure firm assets. Many as-
pects of these bodies of law appear crafted to perform such functions,
and firms routinely employ them to do so. Naturally, all things being
equal, firms will tend to prefer stronger entitlements that are clear, undi-
vided, and exclusive. However, as we have hinted, various forms of mar-
ket failure, including transaction costs, externalities, anticompetitive ef-
fects, or other broader societal interests, may dictate the grant of more
limited rights than might follow from the unmitigated self-interest of
firms.225
In addition to the three aspects of the relative strength of rights dis-
cussed so far - property/liability, clear/muddy, complete/divided -there
are also several other aspects of intellectual property law that bear upon
the adequacy or inadequacy of protection in the context of the firm. A
second aspect, closely related to the dimensions of entitlement strength,
is the breadth of the entitlement itself. The range of embodiments pro-
tected by a given form of intellectual property may be broad or narrow.
How close does an alternative invention have to be before it is consid-
ered to infringe a patent? How similar must two computer programs be
before one is considered to infringe on the other's copyright? The
broader the scope of a right, the more valuable that right is to a firm and
the more opportunity the firm has to enter into transactions that give
others the right to use that entitlement, backed by the threat to sue them
for infringing on the right if they try to use the idea without the firm's
permission.
A third aspect of protection concerns the ease with which a firm ob-
tains a right in the first place-that is, the ease with which the right is rec-
ognized or attained. This dimension is partly a function of the legal cir-
cumstances that trigger recognition of the right. For example, copyright
and common law trademark protection arise spontaneously-for copy-
right upon fixation of the work in a tangible medium,226 or for trademark
in the course of using the mark affixed to goods or services.227 Such intel-
lectual property rights entail no additional costs beyond the creative or
225. See supra Section IIB; see also Burk, supra note 47, at 130-32 (discussing the range of possi-
ble property constructions dictated by transactional considerations).
226. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 (1995); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.1 (4th ed. 1996).
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commercial activity itself. Patent rights and federal trademark registra-
tion, on the other hand, require review by a governmental agency, and so
are more costly to obtain.2" By the same token, this dimension is also a
function of the substantive requirements for the right, which would be
reviewed by a granting agency, or which would determine the circum-
stances for protection to commence. How original or useful or novel or
nonobvious must an idea be in order to receive protection? The less
originality, utility, novelty, or nonobviousness that is required, the more
readily firms can acquire intellectual property rights.
A fourth aspect of protection concerns the allocation of intellectual
property rights between firms and their employees. If an employee cre-
ates, or helps create, a new intellectual property asset, to whom does the
law initially assign that right, the employee or the firm? There exist a va-
riety of rules in both intellectual property law and in business organiza-
tion and agency law that help assign rights between firms and employ-
ees.229 Although property rights can be transferred by contract from
their initial default assignment, such contracts generate exactly the sort
of transaction costs of greatest concern under the theory of the firm.
Thus, initial defaults become important. The greater proportion of rights
that the law assigns to firms rather than employees, the greater the pro-
tection of firm intellectual property.
Following from this, a fifth and final aspect of protection concerns
the ease of transacting around initial assignments of rights. Firms will
transfer rights to intellectual property between themselves, or assign
rights as between the firm and individual employees, but what is required
for the law to recognize a transfer as valid? How clearly need the parties
indicate their assent to the transfer? Who needs to assent? In general,
how much costly procedure must a firm go through to achieve a success-
ful transfer of an intellectual property right? Although some of these
questions are answered by the law of contract or by business association
law, in many cases intellectual property law itself sets requirements for
transactions; the copyright statute requires a signed writing to transfer
exclusive rights;230 patent law incorporates a requirement for assign-
ments.23' Law and economic analysis has engaged in a fair degree of con-
sideration of the nature of default rules, but rather less consideration of
how parties opt out of any given default rule.232 We shall characterize
protection of a right as insubstantial if little procedure is required to
transfer that right and more substantial if costly procedure is required for
transfer.
228. See 35 U.S.C. § 111.
229. See infra Section IV.B.
230. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000).
231. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
232. The leading analysis of rules affecting how to opt out of default rules is probably still Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contract: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
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Mindful of these aspects of entitlement strength, breadth, ease, allo-
cation, and transferability, as well as a recognition of the range of possi-
ble intellectual property forms, we are prepared to consider an inte-
grated framework regarding the effect of different formulations of
intellectual property on the size and structure of the firm.
IV. GOLDILOCKS AND THE FIRM
Given that intellectual property rights have effects on transaction
costs both within firms and between firms, it follows that any provision of
property rights will have simultaneous effects within firms as well as be-
tween firms. This concept requires reconsideration of the effect of prop-
erty rights on the comparative cost of markets and hierarchy. Coase's
fundamental insight is that firms will choose to integrate or dis-integrate
production functions depending upon the relative cost of transactions in
the marketplace or in a firm.233 Thus, all of the studies reviewed in Part
II argue that firms will dis-integrate, and interfirm transactions will be
more likely to occur, if the cost of such transactions is lowered by the
provision of strong property rights. This insight is correct so far as it
goes, but with the caveat that it is true only if strong property rights
lower transaction costs relative to the cost of performing the same pro-
duction functions within a single integrated firm.
But, given the effects that we have shown of intellectual property
within the firm, if robust intellectual property protection is implemented,
it is quite possible-even probable-that those rights may also have an
effect on transaction costs within the firm. As we have shown, intellec-
tual property rights help to secure firm assets and delineate allocation of
assets between the firm and its employees, maintaining the firm as a re-
gion of low transaction costs."3 Thus, if a robust property regime lowers
transaction costs inside and outside the firm in relatively the same de-
gree, nothing much will change -transactions that would have remained
within the firm in the absence of property rights may still remain within
the firm in the presence of property rights because the property rights
have also made production within the firm less costly.
A. Interfirm Transactions
As explored both in the previous literature on intellectual property
and the firm and in our discussion of that literature above, robust provi-
sion of intellectual property rights can encourage interfirm transactions,
in several ways that relate to the various dimensions of adequate prop-
erty that we have also identified above. First, as predicted by the most
traditional justifications of intellectual property, such rights encourage
233. See Coase, supra note 9, at 394-95.
234. See supra notes 106-64 and accompanying text.
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firms to innovate in the first place. 5 The firm that innovates may find
that other firms have better skills and resources for developing and mar-
keting its idea, but absent intellectual property protection the negotia-
tions run into Arrow's paradox of disclosure. As described by Kitch,
Merges, and others, patents can overcome this disclosure paradox. 236 In-
tellectual property helps reduce interfirm transaction costs and allows
firms to specialize in either innovating or in developing innovations.237
As the breadth of protection increases, the innovator becomes more as-
sured that it will be able to prevail in a potential suit against an infringing
developer, making this positive effect somewhat stronger.
The fourth and fifth dimensions of the strength of legal protection
are probably less relevant for interfirm transactions, but not completely
irrelevant. Stronger protection for a firm vis-A-vis its employees may
give greater assurance to parties contracting with a firm that the firm,
and not its employees, has a legal right to an idea. As for the ease of
contracting around a given rights assignment, if it is too easy to contract
away a default right, parties risk doing so inadvertently. They may then
need to take some care in creating contractual provisions so that they
have not inadvertently assigned away rights that they did not intend to
assign. This care may entail some costs in drafting contracts. A law that
requires somewhat more explicit assignment of rights may thus eliminate
some of those costs.
However, unboundedly strong rights may cause problems for inter-
firm transactions. Most obviously, as to the fifth dimension of strength in
protection, if the law makes it very hard to opt out of the initial assign-
ment of rights, then it can become quite costly to agree on assigning
rights to someone else. More subtly, even as to the breadth and ease of
obtaining rights in the first place, overly strong rights can cause prob-
lems. Consider first incentives to create an idea. New ideas often draw
upon old ones. With broad scope of rights, a would-be inventor may find
herself using many protected ideas, thus having to seek permission from
many sources. She will have to transact with parties she would not oth-
erwise have to deal with were the scope of protection more narrow. This
entails new bargaining costs, and at some point bargaining may become
so costly that it is just not worth it, and the innovation is stopped in its
track. This is the anticommons problem that has attracted much atten-
tion recently.238
235. Note that the incentive to the firm as an entity is not necessarily synonymous with, or even
consonant with, the incentives of individuals within a firm to innovate, a topic to which we will turn in
Section IV.B.
236. See Arora & Merges, supra, note 3; Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 46.
237. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3; Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 1.
238. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research, 280 S1. 698 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). This problem
occurs frequently in intellectual property, as for example in the case of attempting to clear the rights
for multimedia or audiovisual works. See, e.g., Katie Dean, Bleary Days for Eyes on the Prize, WIRED
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Similar problems can occur in contracting to develop an idea. With
broad protection, a firm considering entering into an agreement to de-
velop another firm's idea will have to worry that other firms possess
rights that will block developments. The firms may need to involve more
parties in the agreement, thereby increasing costs. This problem is clear
in the discussion of interfirm transactions in the studies promulgated by
Merges and by Arora and Merges. 39 Merges in particular describes a
"post-Chandlerian" world, filled with modular, dis-integrated specialty
firms, where buyers are not necessarily in contractual privity with spe-
cialized producers further up the supply chain, as processes, components
or other inputs from more remote producers are added to the product
prior to the last supplier in the chain."4 He argues that strong property
rights allow these innovative specialty firms to exist because such rights
provide protection for innovations that would otherwise be misappropri-
ated in interfirm negotiations.24t Because contracts are incomplete, and
because many firms in the supply chain will not even be in privity with
one another, contracts cannot reliably deter such misappropriation.
But the vision of such modular, successive inputs signals a potential
danger attending the development of strong property rights. Where
there are many inputs, and strong property rights in each, the potential
arises for the creation of a so-called anticommons, that is, a situation
where property rights are fragmented or too finely divided, impeding or
preventing desirable projects that entail such rights. Merges's "post-
Chandlerian" vision carries the risk of such an anticommons if transac-
tion costs attending the ultimate output product become prohibitive due
to the need to negotiate for the right to use each input. 42
Thus, the property rights that allow specialized firms to proliferate
can also pose a problem. Negotiating with multiple firms for inputs is
NEWS, Dec. 22, 2004, http://www.wired.comlnews/culture/0,66106-1.html. However, Epstein and Kuh-
lick have argued, somewhat unconvincingly in our estimate, that the anticommons problem is based on
faulty analogies to the post-Soviet transition economies in which Heller first identified the problem.
Richard A. Epstein & B. N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady
the Course on Hatch-Waxman (John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 209, 2004), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=536322. Empirical investigation into the potential for an anticommons
in the biotechnology industry, which Heller and Eisenberg identified as at risk for development of a
patent anticommons, has been mixed. A widely cited ethnographic study found little evidence of such
an anticommons, in part because the patents that could create congestion were simply being ignored.
J. P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 324-28 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A.
Merrill eds., 2003). A later empirical study based on citation analysis found evidence of such an anti-
commons. Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow
of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W1 1465.
239. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3; Merges, Transactional View, supra note 2.
240. See Merges, Transactional View, supra note 2, at 1507.
241. See generally Merges, Intangible Assets, supra note 2, at 47-48.
242. Merges is certainly aware of this problem, see Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 471-72;
Merges, Intangible Assets, supra note 2, at 47, if a bit dismissive. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at
452 (downplaying the significance of the anticommons problem).
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costly. Were the specialty firms constituted as divisions of a single inte-
grated firm, access to the technology covered by such patents would be
available without licensing negotiations. And if Merges is correct, then
absent the protection of patents, small post-Chandlerian firms would be-
come integrated into larger firms precisely to achieve such savings; if the
costs of licensing without property rights were prohibitive, the small
firms would merge in order to avoid such transaction costs.
Consequently, the availability of patents to small firms imposes a
cost, and quite possibly a significant cost, on buyers or licensors of tech-
nology. Strong property rights may pose an additional, related problem
as well. Firms that, for any of a number of reasons, are reluctant to li-
cense patented technology may choose to "invent around" existing pat-
ents, producing their own technology that does not fall within the claims
of the patent. Indeed, it has been argued that inventing around is an im-
portant benefit of the patent system, as a spur to further innovation. 43
Alternatively, firms that prefer not to license patented technology may
seek public domain alternatives not covered by the patent. But in tech-
nologies where patents are proliferating, firms that hope to pursue such
alternatives may be faced with a welter of multiple overlapping patents-
what Carl Shapiro has termed a "patent thicket."2" Navigating through
such a thicket, steering clear of overlapping claims, may be difficult,
costly, or simply impossible.
Arora and Merges argue that the innovative benefits of specialized
firms must be taken into account in evaluating the anticommons frag-
mentation problem.245 Although we agree that these factors are the cor-
rect ones to consider, we essentially pose the inverse proposition: the an-
ticommons fragmentation problem must be taken into account in
evaluating the desirability of specialized firms. Some property rights are
good, but more property rights are not necessarily better; property pro-
liferation may create perverse incentives to overspecialize and overtrans-
act. Either excessively strong property rights, or an excessive multiplica-
tion of property rights, may lead to excessive outsourcing of production
functions that were better integrated into a single firm.
Thus, there can be too much of a good thing. A complete absence
of intellectual property protection may make interfirm transactions
costly, but very strong protection may also make such transactions costly.
This becomes more likely as we consider the likely rates of change in the
effects described above. As protection gets stronger, the benefits from
protection increase, but probably at a decreasing rate. The greatest gains
from exploiting an idea probably come from the closest uses, those that
243. See Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc. 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985); State Indus.
v. A.O. Smith Corp. 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
244. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Set-
ting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
245. Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 471.
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will be protected even with just a modest scope of protection. Added
scope brings somewhat added profits, but probably at a decreasing rate.
In contrast, the costs from stronger protection probably go up at an in-
creasing rate. As more and more parties have claims over related ideas,
the costs of bargaining may increase exponentially, as one must bargain
with more and more firms.
This suggests the Goldilocks hypothesis for interfirm transactions:
there exists an intermediate level of legal protection of firm intellectual
property rights that minimizes the costs of interfirm transactions. As le-
gal protection moves away from this optimal level of protection towards
either weaker or stronger protection, the costs of interfirm transactions
increase. We note that the optimal level is relative to various nonlegal
mechanisms that also affect inter- and intrafirm transactions. Thus, the
optimal level of legal protection may vary between industries, between
societies, and over time.
Note that one way firms may cope with heightened interfirm trans-
action costs is to move some transactions within the firm. Thus, suppose
that legal protection is weaker than the optimal level. If firms are afraid
to reveal ideas to outside would-be developers for fear that they will take
the idea without compensation, they may choose to develop the idea in-
ternally, avoiding that risk.246 Thus, with overly weak protection of
rights, more transactions will be done within firms than is the case at the
optimal level of protection for interfirm transactions. Alternatively, sup-
pose that legal protection is stronger than the optimal level for interfirm
transactions. Here, too, firms may respond by bringing some transac-
tions within one firm. The anticommons problem can be reduced if one
firm, rather than many, owns all related property rights. Thus, a firm
could choose to buy up those with related rights as a way around the
costs of interfirm bargaining.247
We have just shown the corollary to the Goldilocks hypothesis for
interfirm transactions: taking the costs of intrafirm bargaining as fixed,
firm size is at a minimum at the optimal level of legal protection for in-
terfirm transactions, and firm size increases as legal protection either in-
creases or decreases from that point. This corollary incorporates the in-
sights of transaction costs economics and GHM residual property rights
theories as applied to intellectual property regimes. But the efficiency of
interfirm transactions is not the sole determinant of firm size.
246. This is the key idea of Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 1. Note that they then face risks
and costs from the new internal transactions. We discuss those risks and costs in Section IV.B. For
here, we take those costs as fixed and ask how the firm boundary varies with variation in the costs of
interfirm transactions.
247. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 452.
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B. Intrafirm Transactions
As we have shown above, robust protection of firm intellectual
property rights can reduce interfirm transaction costs, but only to a point.
Just as the provision of strong property is a mixed blessing for lowering
interfirm transaction costs, so it may be for intrafirm costs. In thinking
about the effects of intrafirm transactions, we must focus on different
parts of the definition of what constitutes adequate, inadequate, or ex-
cessive protection of firm intellectual property. Although strength and
breadth of the right and ease of asserting the right do still matter in some
circumstances, the more important elements here are the default rules
for who is assigned a right, employer or employee, and the ease of opting
out of those default rules. Strong internal protection of firm property
rights involves assigning a wide range of rights in ideas to the firm rather
than its member individuals and making it hard for the firm to transfer
those rights to its members." 8
Firms face both coordination and motivational problems in organiz-
ing internal production.249 Supervisors must direct the action of many
different employees in a large firm. Suppose that employees owned the
rights to many ideas generated within the firm, and hence their consent
was needed to use those ideas within the firm. This could create an anti-
commons problem within the firm. A broad scope in defining intellec-
tual property could worsen this internal anticommons problem as it does
the external anticommons problem. Assigning rights to the firm rather
than employees avoids this coordination problem."0 Of course, through
its employment agreements, the firm could achieve the same result even
if the default rule granted rights to employees, but if most firms would
want rights in their favor, it avoids the costs of contracting to initially as-
sign rights to them. Moreover, it may be easier to opt out of defaults fa-
voring the firm than out of defaults favoring employees."'
For creating and developing many ideas, both individual employees
and the firm must commit resources that may not be easily redeployed.
Thus, the hold-up problem rears its head. 2 If the firm's commitment is
more vulnerable to hold-up than the commitment of its employees, then
that is another reason for assigning rights in favor of the firm.
As for motivation, firm employees, both high-level managers and
others, will not necessarily want to single-mindedly pursue the firm's
stated objectives. Even where it is more efficient to let the firm exploit a
given asset, employees may choose to exploit it for themselves. The firm
can try to guard against such self-dealing through, for example, monitor-
ing or compensation schemes, but such protections are themselves
248. See supra notes 106-64 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 9-41 and accompanying text.
250. See Merges, supra note 7, at 54.
251. See Burk, supra note 4, at 17-18.
252. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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costly.23 Fiduciary duty law helps firms reduce such behavior. For our
purposes, we see fiduciary duty law as making it harder to transfer firm
assets, including intellectual property assets, to employees. The problem
is especially acute for the managers of large public corporations, who
have power over immense resources and do not have shareholders look-
ing closely over their shoulders due to the collective action problems of
dispersed shareholders. 254 This suggests that protection of firm intellec-
tual property from employees should be strongest with respect to top
managers.255
But here, too, protecting a firm's rights too strongly can cause its
own set of problems. Firms want employees to bring effort and creativity
to their jobs. If employees have overly crabbed rights over ideas and
personal assets they develop at work, they will be less motivated to de-
velop those ideas and assets. 256 Employees also face a hold-up problem,
and overly limited rights for them will worsen that problem for them.
Indeed, some employees will decide not to work for a firm at all if their
rights are too restricted. It is likely to be the most innovative and entre-
preneurial employees who stay away from firms if their rights are too
limited.7
Of course, if the law goes too far in assigning rights to the firm, a
firm can always contract around that assignment. However, strong legal
protection can make opting out costly and hard to do. This adds its own
set of costs, and can make internal decision making more clumsy and
time consuming. It can reduce firm risk taking and lead to overly cau-
tious decisions. Corporate law scholars have long noted the problems of
overly strong fiduciary duty protections.258
Thus, as with interfirm legal protection, intrafirm protection of firm
intellectual property rights can be either too weak or too strong. This
suggests the Goldilocks hypothesis for intrafirm transactions: there exists
an intermediate level of legal protection of firm intellectual property
rights that minimizes the costs of intrafirm transactions. As legal protec-
tion moves away from this optimal level of protection towards either
weaker or stronger protection, the costs of intrafirm transactions in-
crease. Again, the optimal level may vary depending on a variety of
nonlegal factors.
253. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 15, at 308.
254. See Brudney & Clark, supra note 142, at 1003.
255. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
256. See Merges, supra note 7, at 17.
257. On the inhospitability of large, bureaucratic corporations to entrepreneurial individuals, see
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 140-41 (3d ed. 1950).
258. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 251-69
(2002) (discussing justifications for the business' judgment rule as a limit on the strength of fiduciary
duty scrutiny); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 91-102 (1991) (same).
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Once again, let us start out at the optimal level of intrafirm legal
protection and take the level of interfirm protection as constant. Then
we ask how firm size changes as the level of intrafirm legal protection ei-
ther decreases or increases from the optimal level. As intrafirm protec-
tion decreases, employees can more easily exploit firm ideas for their
own benefit. The firm can take measures to protect against this, but
those measures are costly. Coordinating becomes harder as employees
must consent to the firm's use of their ideas. 59 In response to these
higher costs, firms will hire fewer employees. It becomes harder to coor-
dinate and motivate in larger firms, and so firms will respond to the
higher costs by choosing to be smaller. Firms will also become smaller as
employees more readily leave to exploit ideas that they have learned
within the firm. Either way, firm size will be lower than size at the opti-
mal level of intrafirm protection.
Similarly, suppose that intrafirm legal protection increases from the
optimal level. Employees are now reluctant to join firms, and .require
higher compensation to do so. Decision making within the firm becomes
more cumbersome, and so firms will not be able to coordinate the deci-
sions of a large number of employees as well. Managers take on less risk,
both because entrepreneurial types are scared away and because riskier
decisions create more risk of litigation under tough fiduciary duty laws.
Companies making less risky decisions grow more slowly.2" For all of
these reasons, firm size is lower than at the optimal level of intrafirm pro-
tection.
We have just shown the corollary to the Goldilocks hypothesis for
intrafirm transactions: taking the costs of interfirm bargaining as fixed,
firm size is at a maximum at the optimal level of legal protection for in-
trafirm transactions, and firm size decreases as legal protection either in-
creases or decreases from that point.
C. Interfirm and Intrafirm Transactions Combined
The overall level of transaction costs, and hence the amount of in-
novation and development that will occur, depends on the level of both
interfirm and intrafirm transaction costs. The size and boundaries of
firms also depends on the interaction of interfirm and intrafirm costs.
We thus need to bring together the analysis in Sections A and B.
This requires us to note and clarify an ambiguity in both statements
of the Goldilocks hypotheses and corollaries above. The hypotheses
state that there is an optimal, intermediate level of interfirm or intrafirm
legal protection that minimizes interfirm or intrafirm transaction costs.
Each statement of the hypothesis leaves out any statement of the level of
259. See Merges, supra note 7, at 12-13.
260. The classic analysis of the link between risk taking, innovation, and firm success and growth
is Schumpeter. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 257, at 132.
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the other sort of legal protection, i.e., the interfirm hypothesis leaves out
intrafirm protection, and vice versa. A more precise statement of the
hypotheses would say that for any given level of intrafirm or interfirm le-
gal protection, there is an optimal, intermediate level of interfirm or in-
trafirm legal protection. The optimal level for one type of protection
may vary with the level of the other type of protection, although that
need not be so. We shall see further complications along these lines in
this Section and Section D.
In exploring the complications that arise from the effect of intellec-
tual property inside and outside the firm, we necessarily abstract from
many factors. The optimal levels of legal protections depend on many
factors: technology, skills, natural resources, values, and culture, among
other things. These will vary by industry and over time. Thus, the opti-
mal levels of protection will vary by industry and over time as well. Over
a long range of time, the law can in turn affect those various factors, and
vice versa, so the long-term evolutionary story is quite complex. Later
we will touch occasionally, and lightly, on some related topics. We will
also assume for the moment that we can vary interfirm and intrafirm le-
gal protection independently of each other. This assumption is wrong,
and we will consider the impact of dropping it in Section D. For the
moment, we also treat levels of protection as two simple dimensions, one
for interfirm protection and one for intrafirm protection. We have al-
ready seen that the level of legal protection actually involves a variety of
facets,26' and later we shall consider some of the implications of the mul-
tifaceted nature of such protection.
For now, let us assume that interfirm legal protection can take three
levels: the optimal level, too low, and too high.262 Assume the same for
intrafirm legal protection. Of course, in reality each of these is a contin-
uum, and if we were formally modeling this interaction we would assume
continuous levels of protection. However, for our purposes here it is
conceptually clearer to divide each into three possible levels.
Assuming for the moment that we can vary interfirm and intrafirm
protection independently of each other, with each taking three possible
levels, we have nine possible combinations. Table 1 shows these nine
possibilities.
261. See supra Part III.
262. This thus ignores the point made at the end of Section IV.B that the optimal level of one
type of protection may depend on the level of the other type of protection.
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TABLE 1
________ _________Intrafirm Legal Protection_______
Inadequate
" High TC
" Firms cannot
protect them-
selves from
outside or in-
side exploita-
tion.
e Firm size
indeterminate
compared to
size at opti-
mum.
Optimal
* Moderate
TC
* Firms can-
not protect IP
in outside
transactions,
so integrate
more within
firm.
* Firm size
large com-
pared to op-
timum.
Excessive
" High TC
• Firms cannot
protect IP in
outside trans,
but poor em-
ployee motiva-
tion.
* Firm size in-
determinate
compared to
optimum.
e Moderate e Low TC * Moderate TC
TC * Both inside * Poor em-
* Insiders op- and outside ployee motiva-
portunistic, transactions tion, outside
Optimal but outside are at lowest transactions
transactions possible cost. work well.
work well. * Firm size
* Firm size small com-
small com- pared to opti-
pared to opti- mum.
mum.
6
_4 5
" High TC
" Insiders ex-
ploit firm, but
face anticom-
mons outside.
- Firm size
unclear com-
pared to size
at optimum.
* Moderate
TC
* Anticom-
mons outside,
so more inte-
gration within
firm.
* Firm size
large com-
pared to op-
timum.
" High TC
" Hard to mo-
tivate insiders,
but face anti-
commons out-
side.
- Firm size un-
clear compared
to size at opti-
mum.
In interpreting this table, let us start with cell 5, where both types of
legal protection are at their optimal levels. Here, overall transaction
costs are at a minimum. Hence, economic activities are at their most ef-
ficient level. We will find robust levels of innovation. Given the costs of
interfirm and intrafirm transactions, economic pressures will force a dis-
tribution of firms and firm boundaries that economizes on transaction
Inadequate
Interfirm
Legal
Protection
Excessive
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costs. 263 Transactions that can be accomplished at lower cost within a
firm will be executed there, otherwise transactions will be executed be-
tween firms. We will take firm size and boundary set in this case as a
benchmark for the other cases.
Next, let us consider the other two cells in the column that includes
cell 5, i.e., cells 2 and 8. In these two cells, intrafirm legal protection is at
its optimal level, but interfirm protection is not optimal. In cell 2, inter-
firm protection is too weak. Firms that would like to conduct transac-
tions involving intellectual property with other firms find it hard to pro-
tect themselves from exploitation. In response, some choose to conduct
some transactions within the firm that would be conducted between firms
in cell 5. Thus, firms tend to be larger than at the overall minimum cost
level of cell 5.264
In cell 8, interfirm legal protection is now too strong. Firms face the
anticommons problem that we have described,265 hampering the creation
and development of new ideas. In response, firms merge to avoid the
costs of external transactions. Once again, as with cell 2, some transac-
tions that in cell 5 would be conducted between firms are now executed
within a firm. Firm size is again larger than the first best level of cell 5.
We move on to the other two cells in the row containing cell 5, i.e.,
cells 4 and 6. These are the mirror image of cells 2 and 8. Here, inter-
firm legal protection is at its optimal level, but intrafirm legal protection
is not. In cell 4 intrafirm legal protection is too weak. Firms here have
trouble controlling opportunistic insiders, and may have an internal anti-
commons problem as individual employee owners of different rights
make coordination difficult. In response, firms hire fewer employees,
and more specialized firms are formed to handle some transactions that
would be handled within one firm in cell 5. Firm size is thus smaller than
the first best level of cell 5.266
In cell 6 the level of interfirm protection is optimal but intrafirm le-
gal protection is excessive. Employees demand high compensation to
work for firms where they will struggle to control assets they helped de-
velop, and decision making is cumbersome and overly risk averse. Firms
hire fewer employees and do not grow as quickly. Thus, as in cell 4, firm
size is smaller than the first best level of cell 5.267
Finally, we have the four comers. In these, both interfirm and in-
trafirm legal protection are at nonoptimal levels. Transaction costs are at
their highest, and innovation at its lowest. Firm size relative to that in
cell 5, the optimal point, is indeterminate. To begin with, consider cell 1.
263. See Coase, supra note 9, at 10-11; see also infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
264. This is the situation that concerns Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 1.
265. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
266. See Merges, supra note 7, at 13-16.
267. This is a concern of many corporate law scholars who frown upon overly strong application
of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 258; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 258.
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Here, both sorts of legal protection are inadequate. Employees take ad-
vantage of their firms, and yet business with other firms is also risky as
the law does not protect a firm's intellectual property from being stolen
by its business partners. Firms must choose their poison. Some transac-
tions will just not happen at all, as the costs of executing them either be-
tween firms or within the firm are too large. We cannot say whether
firms are larger or smaller than at the optimal level of cell 5. It depends
on the degree of variation from the optimum for each type of legal pro-
tection, among other factors.
In cell 3, interfirm protection is inadequate and intrafirm protection
is excessive. Firms have trouble protecting themselves in transactions
with other firms, but if they try to bring transactions within one firm they
face hard-to-motivate employees and cumbersome decision making.
Once again, whether more or fewer transactions occur within firms than
would occur under the conditions of cell 5 depends on the relative magni-
tude of these two divergences from the optimum.
Cell 7 is the mirror image of cell 3: interfirm protection is excessive
and intrafirm protection is inadequate. External transactions face an an-
ticommons problem, but if firms try to internalize that problem by com-
bining into a larger firm they face opportunistic employees and managers
who will exploit the assets of that firm. Again, firm size relative to cell 5
depends on the relative magnitude of these effects.
Finally, in cell 9 both types of legal protection are excessive. Firms
face an anticommons problem if they do not merge, but employees are
reluctant to work in large merged businesses and to work hard for a large
merged business, and decision making is cumbersome and costly. The
magnitude of these two effects determines whether firms will be larger or
smaller than those in cell 5.
The picture that table 1 presents is, of course, highly schematic and
simplified. However, we believe that it has considerable suggestive
power. Although simplified, it already shows some of the complications
that come from considering the interaction between how legal rules re-
lated to intellectual property affect the costs of between-firm transactions
and within-firm transactions. Even at this point in the analysis, before
we add some complications, one can see how both making predictions
and making policy suggestions is a delicate task. We must consider the
effect of legal rules on both interfirm and intrafirm transactions, and the
direction of the effect of varying rules is not monotonic. Transaction
costs may fall and then rise as one raises legal protection from a low
level. The size of firms may rise and then fall, or vice versa. Determin-
ing the optimum level of protection depends on balancing the costs and
benefits from several margins of variation. And yet, although the table
suggests that the task of analysis is complicated, the table itself is simple
enough that we think it helps impose some useful order in thinking
through these hard problems.
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D. Dynamics of Laws That Affect Both
We now relax one of the assumptions from Section C. There, we
assumed that we could vary the interfirm and intrafirm legal protections
independently of each other.268 That would be so if separate laws set the
two different kinds of protection. To a certain degree, that is right. Con-
sider the different dimensions of legal protection that we set out in Part
III. The strength and ease of regimes creating intellectual property affect
interfirm transactions more strongly than intrafirm transactions, as a look
back at Section A will show. The basic rules of patent, copyright, and
trade secrecy law, in turn, are the main influence on strength and ease of
obtaining intellectual property. In contrast, the division of intellectual
property rights between firm and employees and the ease of opting out
of default assignments affect mainly intrafirm transactions, as a look back
at Section B will show. Specific parts of the law of intellectual property,
such as the work for hire doctrine and the shop right,269 and parts of fidu-
ciary duty and agency law are the main influence on the division of intel-
lectual property rights and the ease of opting out of default assignments.
However, the effects of these different areas of the law cannot be
kept quite so distinct. The scope of intellectual property rights can affect
intrafirm transactions too.270 In turn, the division of rights between firm
and employees can affect interfirm transactions. 71
These interrelationships complicate our previous analysis. If we
think about starting at a given level of legal protection, and ask how
moving from that level will affect transaction costs, we must now worry
about how the change in law will affect both interfirm and intrafirm
transaction costs. However, as long as from any given starting point the
direction of the effect for both types of costs is the same, the complica-
tion in the analysis does not seem too severe, at least for determining the
overall cost-minimizing level of legal protection. If a given move always
either lowers or raises both types of transaction costs, the policy implica-
tions are unambiguous-move in the direction that lowers both types of
costs. The effect on firm size may be ambiguous though. If a given legal
change lowers both sets of transaction costs, then whether the change
will lead to an expansion or narrowing of firm boundaries will depend on
the relative size of the changes in the two sets of costs.
Matters become more complicated still if some changes in legal pro-
tection can move transaction costs in different directions. In that case,
there may not be any point like cell 5 that simultaneously minimizes both
sets of transaction costs. There will still be a point that minimizes overall
268. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
269. See Burk, supra note 4, at 13-14.
270. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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transaction costs (the sum of interfirm and intrafirm costs), but that point
will not minimize each type of cost.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND REFINEMENTS
We have compared and contrasted how different types of laws han-
dle the transfer of intellectual property rights. To this point we have as-
sumed relatively uniform characteristics for technologies subject to intel-
lectual property law. But implicit in much of our discussion is a
recognition that technologies vary enormously in their characteristics,
such as appropriability. Some technologies will be relatively transparent
to an observer, such as some mechanical technologies, requiring no more
than a cursory examination by an employee or licensee to understand
how they operate. Other technologies will be far more opaque, such as
perhaps semiconductor design, requiring extensive explanation and de-
tailed disclosure to understand. The first type of technology is at far
greater risk of misappropriation if unprotected by property rights, and
can perhaps be carried away in human memory. The second may be
more resistant to misappropriation; purloining such information may re-
quire the theft of physical documentation, as well as a substantial period
of analysis.
This, in turn, implies that different technologies will be more or less
prone to confer benefits such as first mover advantages on the developer.
Technologies will also differ in the degree of integration with comple-
mentary assets that are required for the use of the technology. Thus, nu-
clear power technologies can exist only within a complex matrix of tech-
nical and regulatory inputs;272 misappropriated nuclear power know-how
is likely unusable without also obtaining all the attendant technical
know-how necessary for licensing, fuel procurement, disposal of spent
fuel rods, and so on. Certainly, it will be difficult to use such technology
in isolation, or for that matter, in secret.
Our analysis therefore suggests that different forms of intellectual
property may be optimal for different types of firms in different situa-
tions. This conclusion, in turn, suggests the corollary that different forms
of intellectual property will predominate in different industries, based
upon the practices and characteristics of the industry. We have implicitly
assumed such clustering of intellectual property, at least to some degree,
in our discussion to this point. In noting the various characteristics of
patent, copyright, and trade secrecy, describing their application in dif-
ferent situations,273 we are frequently speaking by industry-copyright
will be the primary mode of securing firm assets in the motion picture in-
dustry, whereas patent will be the primary mode in biotechnology.
272. See generally LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS
IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1986).
273. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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We have also largely assumed that the forms of intellectual property
are monolithic-that there exist relatively uniform characteristics for in-
tellectual property protection within broad classes; patents as a class con-
fer a set of "strong" property rights; trade secrets as a class confer a dif-
ferent set of rights; and so on. But in separate work with Mark Lemley,
one of us (Burk) has argued that the different economic profiles of inno-
vation in various industries require industry-specific calibration, or tailor-
ing of intellectual property incentives, and that courts can tailor statutes
of general application by means of fact-driven "policy levers" within the
statutes.274 We suspect that the same is true with regard to reaching the
optimal point of transaction costs for various industries, and that such
tailoring mechanisms are available within intellectual property statutes.
For example, the agency-based determination articulated by the Su-
preme Court for the assessment of whether a work is made for hire, is a
flexible, multi-factor test that we suspect will vary generally by industry,
depending upon the practices or characteristics of the industry. The
same applies for the application of fiduciary duty rules.275
Given the need and opportunity for such tailoring, there may be
competitive pressures in the interjurisdictional market for intellectual
property law to develop laws tailored to the needs of specific indus-
tries. 76 Jurisdictions may attract certain businesses by offering intellec-
tual property that best meets the transaction cost profile of that busi-
ness.277 Certainly there is a large literature documenting and analyzing
such competition in the development of corporate law.278 For this paper
we have confined ourselves to the United States, so for the most part
there is little opportunity to study interjurisdictional variation. Some of
the relevant laws, such as patent, copyright, and federal trademark regis-
tration, are set nationally, so there is only one relevant set of laws. Even
274. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1589
(2003). Other commentators have identified similar incentive policy levers within copyright. See Mi-
chael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U.
L. REV. 845 (2006); Joseph P. Liu & Stacey L. Dogan, Copyright Law and Subject Matter Specificity:
The Case of Computer Software, 2 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 203. (2005).
275. See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 152, §§ 4.1-2.
276. See Dan L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE:
INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 205 (Brian Kahin &
Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
277. Id. Efforts toward interjurisdictional harmonization of intellectual property offer the benefit
of standardization, but dampen the benefits of competitive legal innovation. See Dan L. Burk, Law as
a Network Standard, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH 63 (2005).
278. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5-6 (1993);
Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for
Corporate Charters; "Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 (1980); Daniel
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corpo-
ration Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Federalism in Corpo-
rate Law, 30 J. CORP. L. 99 (2005); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorpora-
tion Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
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for laws set at the state level, such as agency law, corporate law, and
trade secrecy, the basic structure of the law is quite similar across states.
There is at least one interesting exception to the general rule of
similarity across states, and it provides an intriguing test-bed for the
framework we have developed. That exception concerns how states treat
noncompetition agreements between firms and employees. Especially
for employees who naturally gather sensitive and important firm-specific
information, firms will be concerned that those employees will leave to
join a competitor, or found a competitor, and use the information they
have learned against their old employer. To protect against this possibil-
ity, firms may ask such employees to sign noncompetition agreements
that prevent them, upon leaving the firm, from competing against the
firm for a specified length of time, in a specified area, for a specified
scope of activities. Note that in all states, if firms want to protect against
competition by former employees, they must negotiate such agreements;
thus, the default rule everywhere, in the United States at least, favors
employees on this point. 79
Where states differ is in the ability of firms and employees to opt
out of this default rule. A fully contractarian law would recognize such
noncompetition agreements as fully enforceable no matter what their
contents, subject only to a requirement that there be adequate indication
that both parties indeed agreed to it and that the agreement be specific
enough that a court knows when the agreement is being violated. How-
ever, American law has not taken such a fully contractarian approach to
noncompetition agreements. States differ, though, in how far they stray
from a contractarian approach.
The common law treatment of noncompetition agreements, fol-
lowed in most states, strays only moderately far from contractarianism.
It treats such agreements as enforceable as long as they are "reasonable"
as to time, geographic range, and scope of activity. 8 ' Of course, "reason-
able" is the classic weasel word of lawyers, but the accumulation of case
law over time has given a decently concrete understanding of how far
such agreements can go, and the answer is, decently far.
Some states put tougher limits on noncompetition agreements.
Most important is California, which will not treat noncompetition
agreements tied to employment agreements as valid at all, no matter how
limited their scope. 81 California thus provides a weaker protection of
firm rights than the common law approach; the default rule favors em-
ployees in both, but at least firms can opt out of that rule, to a limited ex-
tent, under the common law, whereas they are stuck with the rule in Cali-
fornia.
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
280. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 188 (1981).
281. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2001).
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Some have hypothesized that this difference in rules helps explain
the Silicon Valley phenomenon in California. Scholars have compared
high tech firms in Silicon Valley with those in the Route 128 cluster near
Boston.282 The Massachusetts firms are typically larger and more inte-
grated than the California firms.283 Ronald Gilson argues that this is so in
part because the California employees can move from firm to firm more
easily, without the obstacle of noncompetition agreements.2 Thus, em-
ployees will start out in one firm, then use what they have learned to
found a new firm of their own or work for someone else's start-up.
How does this story fit in with our theory from Part IV? Consider a
graph that plots the degree of protection of intrafirm property rights on
the horizontal axis and the size of the firm on the vertical axis. The
graph will have an inverted U shape, as shown in figures 1 through 3, for
reasons described in Part IV; for overly weak protection of firm rights,
firms will be small because they cannot protect themselves well enough
from employee expropriation, while for overly strong protection of firm
rights, firms will be small because employees will be loathe to work for
firms in which they are unprotected.285
Now, the discussion of Silicon Valley versus Route 128 suggests two
stylized facts. First, California lies to the left of Massachusetts on the
graph, as the protection of firm rights is weaker in California. Second,
Massachusetts lies above California on the graph, as the average firm size
is larger in Massachusetts. This leaves three basic possibilities. Figure 1
depicts the first, where both states are to the left of the point where firm
size is largest. Figure 2 depicts the second, with Massachusetts at the
point of largest firm size and California to the left of that. Figure 3 de-
picts the third, with California to the left of the point of largest firm size
and Massachusetts to the right, but with the curves such that the Massa-
chusetts point is higher than that of California.
282. See HYDE, supra note 214.
283. See SAXANIAN, supra note 214.
284. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Sili-
con Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
285. See supra Section IV.C.
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Can we infer anything about the optimality of the laws? If we fol-
low the assumption of Part IV that firm size is greatest at the Goldilocks
point where intrafirm protection is optimal, then perhaps yes. In both
figures 1 and 2, the Massachusetts law is unambiguously closer to the op-
timum point than the California law. Figure 3 is more ambiguous, but
even there we can say that firm size in Massachusetts is closer to the op-
timum firm size; whether the law is closer to the optimum law and trans-
action costs are lower in Massachusetts is less clear without imposing
more structure on the theory and obtaining more evidence.
Even as much as we have said here, though, seems to go against the
grain of those who praise the California rule as having encouraged more
innovation and risk taking.286 How does that story differ from our analy-
sis so far? In Part IV we implicitly assumed that market forces push firm
size to its socially optimal level given existing law. Thus, firms will be
largest where intrafirm protection is at its optimal point, and smaller
above and below that point as transacting within the firm is more costly
above and below that point.- Gilson's story does not seem to accept that
assumption.287 Rather, there is a wedge between private behavior and
the social optimum in his story.28 In Massachusetts, firms and their em-
ployees contract into noncompetition agreements that discourage new
firm formation, hurting society, and hence it is best to curtail their ability
286. See Gilson, supra note 284.
287. See id.
288. See id.
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to enter into such contracts. 89 Gilson argues there is a market ineffi-
ciency due to agglomeration externalities. 2' Firms collectively benefit
from employee mobility, but each individual firm would prefer that its
own employees stay put, so there is a collective action problem. 29' How-
ever, our story suggests a further question that Gilson must answer. If
noncompetition covenants are inefficient, why don't Massachusetts em-
ployees demand higher wages in order to accept them? Our framework
suggests that the intrafirm implementation of strong intellectual property
rights may tend to hamper employee movement and motivation. In or-
der to attract and retain high quality employees, small firms might have
to forgo or de-emphasize intellectual property rights, and indeed there is
evidence of such practice in biotechnology.292
Still, Gilson's externality story may be right. Thus, it may be possi-
ble that for some range of protection, stronger than the cost-minimizing
level, firm size is actually larger than the size at the cost-minimizing level;
although presumably if legal protection becomes too strong-as, for ex-
ample, one imagines a mandatory rule that forbids employees from ever
competing with old employers anywhere-then the costs to employees
will be such that firm size will fall as some employees resist the negative
consequences of joining a firm. We remain agnostic as to whether this
has indeed happened in Massachusetts; it is quite possible that one of the
cases depicted in figures 1 through 3 does accurately describe the two
states. However, the possibility does exist, and is an important qualifica-
tion to our analysis in Part IV.
There may be a simpler way to reconcile Gilson's analysis with ours.
The last few paragraphs treat the noncompetition covenant laws as af-
fecting intrafirm legal protection. Perhaps we should instead conceive it
as affecting interfirm legal protection. When employees move between
firms, they transfer information from one firm to another. Conceived of
as affecting interfirm legal protection, Gilson's story fits easily within
ours. The situation could be something like that in figure 4; Massachu-
setts's protection goes beyond the optimal point, with California being at
the optimal point. Or California could instead also be to the right of the
optimal point, but less so than Massachusetts, or to the left of the opti-
mum, but at a point where the transaction costs are lower than in Massa-
chusetts; we leave those graphs as an exercise for the reader. This treats
the Massachusetts rule, and hence the common law rule, as in effect cre-
ating an anticommons problem, as firms have too much ability to exploit
the information embodied in their employees' human capital, and they
face a collective action problem in reconciling their competing rights. 293
289. See id.
290. Id. at 609.
291. See id. at 596.
292. See, e.g., Michael A. Epstein & Beth K. Neelman, Trade Secrets: Novel Applications to Bio-
technology, 1 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 16, 19 (1988).
293. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
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This illustrates the point of Part IV.D-that the same legal rule may af-
fect both interfirm and intrafirm transaction costs.
Firm Size
FIGURE 4
Weak
Protection of Interfirm Property Rights
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article we have attempted to integrate two convergent lines
of research regarding intellectual property and the firm-one looking at
the effect of intellectual property on transaction costs within the firm and
the other looking at the effect of intellectual property rights on transac-
tion costs between firms. We hope to have shown that these discussions
are inextricably linked to one another via Coase's germinal theory of the
firm, and to have offered a general framework for considering the inter-
action of these effects. In doing so, we have necessarily recognized the
analytical complexity that occurs when internal and external costs inter-
sect at the boundary of the firm; the optimal strength of intellectual
property rights vis-A-vis firm transactions is a product of multiple and
sometimes elusive factors. The analysis of intellectual property and the
firm might have seemed simpler if we were willing to say that the solu-
tion is always to provide strong property rights and have faith that every-
thing will then work itself out. 94 But we suspect that viewing a complex
294. This somewhat fundamentalist article of faith is increasingly common in discussions of intel-
lectual property law. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 82 TEX. L.
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world in terms of simple rules only works if one is oblivious to much of
the world's complexity.
Recognizing such complexity necessarily means that the many varia-
tions and ramifications- of our framework cannot be fully explored in a
single article. There is clearly a great deal of fascinating and valuable
territory yet to be charted in considering the role of intellectual property
vis-A-vis the theory of the firm. We recognize that this article by no
means details all the features of the landscape; our discussion here has
been primarily intended to provide a map and locate certain key land-
marks for further exploration. For example, in integrating the parallel
bodies of literature that have evolved to date regarding intellectual prop-
erty and the firm, we have followed that literature in focusing primarily
on patent and trade secrecy laws as polar opposites, introducing for con-
trast only a few brief vignettes concerning copyright. But we expect
there are yet substantial insights regarding copyright as a firm asset that
our sparse discussion has not begun to explicate. Additionally, we have
barely noted the presence of trademarks, although this last form of intel-
lectual property is ubiquitous in modern firms and often constitutes the
most valuable asset of the firm. We expect trademark law to provide a
fruitful area for additional research.
Moreover, our project here has been primarily descriptive, rather
than normative. We have discussed the role of intellectual property
within the theory of the firm and have noted certain congruencies be-
tween those expectations and the features of intellectual property and
business association law as currently constituted. We expect that many
such congruencies may have developed in response to the explicit or im-
plicit needs of the marketplace. But we recognize that-with apologies
to Justice Holmes-the path of the law is neither entirely logic, nor yet
entirely experience,295 but a combination of anomalous factors including
opportunism, market failure, path dependence, and rent seeking, all of
which may have introduced into intellectual property and business asso-
ciation law distortions that are contrary to the needs of the firm.296 A fur-
ther, rich area of research will likely be to identify and propose correc-
tions to such distortions.
Indeed, it is even possible that the law rather pervasively and sys-
tematically provides too little protection for employees vis- -vis firms. In
transactions that involve inchoate firm-specific assets embodied in em-
ployees' human capital, both firms and employees face a hold-up prob-
REV. 1031, 1032 (2005) (discussing the trend toward excessive propertization of intangibles); see also
Burk, supra note 187, at 125-26, 132-36 (noting a similar trend toward propertization). See generally
Lemley, supra note 70 (same).
295. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881); see
also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469-74 (1897) (discussing
the primacy of "tradition" over logic in law).
296. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 896-903 (1987) (detailing rent-seeking behaviors in the enactment of copyright legislation).
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lem. We have seen why the law might best assign rights to firms in such
circumstances. However, this leaves employees open to exploitation, so
that the opposite assignment might be better. Even if assigning rights to
the firm is best, it is possible that protection of employees then requires
assigning more power to employees within firms than we observe."7 This
may be becoming increasingly true as knowledge employees become a
more important part of many firms.298
Another area ripe for future research is a comparative exploration
of the issues discussed here across different countries and legal systems.
Additionally, sector-specific studies, particularly empirical studies, may
also prove a fruitful avenue of future research. Certain industries offer
econometric profiles that may display the effects we describe. For exam-
ple, the American biotechnology industry is characterized by a large
number of small, research-oriented, dedicated biotechnology companies,
or DBCs. Often a patent or cluster of patents are the only assets of such
firms. Merges and Arora focus considerable attention on this sector, ap-
parently seeing there evidence of a robust collection of specialized post-
Chandlerian firms.29  But few of these firms thrive; they fail at a fairly
high rate or are acquired by larger firms.3" This rate of failure and ac-
quisition is not especially indicative of efficiency,3"' and we suspect may,
in fact, point to an overabundance of patents, leading to an inefficiently
large number of dis-integrated firms. The Goldilocks hypothesis suggests
that firms will respond to such inefficient disintegration through reinte-
gration,' i.e., through acquisitions or through the disappearance of some
firms, which, as we have just suggested, seems to be the case. Closer ex-
amination of the biotechnology industry may reveal that the provision of
patents, primarily by way of the federal Bayh-Dole Act,3"3 has passed the
"Goldilocks" point for optimal firm size.
Similarly intriguing questions are suggested by the recent shift in
patenting practice in the computer software industry. For a variety of
practical and historical reasons, the last quarter of the twentieth century
saw software primarily reliant upon copyright for intellectual property
protection. But over the past decade or so, as courts and the Patent Of-
fice have become more amenable to software patent claims, the industry
297. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at
Work (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-06), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=878790.
298. See A Survey of the Company: The New Organisation, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 3-5.
299. See Arora & Merges, supra note 3, at 451.
300. See Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Complementarity and External Linkages: The
Strategies of the Large Firms in Biotechnology, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 361, 365 (1990).
301. lain M. Cockburn, Blurred Boundaries: Tensions Between Open Scientific Resources and
Commercial Exploitation of Knowledge in Biomedical Research 9, 12 (Apr. 30, 2005), http://people.
bu.edu/cockburn/cockburn-blurred-boundaries.pdL
302. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
303. Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 200-211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-29 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-211). For additional criticisms of Bayh-Dole, see Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-
Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).
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has become increasingly reliant upon patents rather than copyrights for
protection. This change from a weaker to a stronger form of intellectual
property protection may also have implications for the optimal size and
structure of software firms. Such industry case studies, together with fur-
ther theoretical exploration, will be important to defining the points at
which rights are neither too sparse, nor too extravagant, but "just right"
for the intrafirm and interfirm purposes of intellectual property.
